Arjun Sengupta
India needs to evolve quickly strategies to meet the global crisis by increasing domestic demand.
The international crisis is continuing, and India has to protect itself from global contraction by increasingly relying on the domestic market. All the sops given to exporters, even a major depreciation of the rupee, have not helped overcome the slack in world demand for exports. Unless Indian growth picks up to revive confidence in the country’s future, the liquidity crunch in the industrial countries will continue to pull out foreign capital from India. As the Indian stock markets remain depressed, the asset value of Indian corporates will continue to fall, reducing their creditworthiness. The reluctance of the banks to lend them even funds to meet working capital needs will lead to a cut-back in production and employment. With the outflow of the dollar continuing, there is hardly any likelihood of interest rates falling. The global financial crisis will then convert itself into a real economic crisis — unless India effectively insulates its markets, compensating for the slack in the global market by expanding domestic demand.
Although the Indian economy is very large, its growth over the last 20 years was confined to only a small fraction of the population — catering to roughly 23 per cent of the people. It has bypassed the other 77 per cent. This section has seen very little increase in income and consumption, and its members have been producing and trading mostly among themselves. The rapid economic growth has trickled down to them only partially. As a result, only some people who were extremely poor and were spending less than Rs. 12 a day moved out of poverty to just one stage above and joined the ranks of the 77 per cent in 2004-2005, but they still live below Rs. 20 a day. They have remained stuck at that level, watching helplessly as the growth process bypassed them.
However, the other 23 per cent, constituting more than a billion people, has provided a market larger than most other economies of the world and attracted world investors and traders. But the 77 per cent who were bypassed comprise the poorest of the country’s people. Most of them are illiterate or have only primary-level education, and suffer from malnutrition and ill-health. Most of them are unemployed or belong to the working poor, or self-employed unorganised working class. In agriculture 84 per cent of our farmer households belong to this economy. They are small and marginal farmers with less than 2 hectares of land with low level of productivity. They can barely survive on their land and have to look for means of livelihood in non-farm jobs in the local markets.
In industry there are 58 million enterprises providing employment to 104 million workers. They work mostly in units with an investment of less than Rs. 5 lakh, and under miserable working conditions. Yet they contribute 31 per cent of GDP, spread over the whole of India, working in handloom, handicraft, coir, leather, apparel, food processing and metal products enterprises, among others. Almost 90 per cent of their product is absorbed in the domestic market. A fiscal stimulus meant to get the country out of the economic crisis must now concentrate on stimulating this part of the economy and through that expand domestic demand.
First, we must increase finance and credit to the 58 million tiny, non-farm units. Of them, 54 million have an investment of less than Rs. 5 lakh, and get only 2.2 per cent of the net bank credit extended in the country. The remaining four million units with an investment of up to Rs. 25 lakh get hardly 4 per cent of the net bank credit. Even a 1 per cent increase in credit to them will increase employment by roughly 10 million and output by about 0.4 per cent of GDP. As only 10 per cent of that product is exported, there will be no problem in absorbing that in the domestic economy. Except producers of gem and jewellery and so on that are specifically export-oriented, other producers of textiles, garments and leather goods will not find it difficult to adjust their exports to suit the domestic markets.
Providing finance to these enterprises will of course need some institutional changes. The National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS) worked out a scheme more than a year ago to create an institution similar to the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), called NAFUS. It will be a development finance institution, refinancing commercial credit and providing marketing, technology and risk cover facility. This was a promise set out in the Common Minimum Programme, a promise that was specifically meant to promote enterprises in the unorganised economy. That proposal needs to be cleared by the government immediately, with substantial provision of capital and leveraging facilities. That should be by means of a programme for small and marginal farmers who hold less than 2 ha. They require substantial support for extension services, land development, minor irrigation and development of a marketing network. Most often they will not be viable within agriculture and have to be persuaded to move on to non-farm activities with financing and credit support, similar to non-farm micro-enterprises. The NCEUS has proposed a Rs. 5,000-crore programme for the development of small and marginal farmers through the provision of incentives for the dissemination of information among groups and for carrying out productive activities. That has to be in addition to the general plan of agriculture development, whose benefits — including subsidies, credit and finances — are captured by big farmers in the absence of a specifically targeted programme.
The fiscal stimulus should also cover the expansion of infrastructure, especially for the unorganised economy. Overall infrastructure investment such as that in the power, transport and communication sectors will also benefit the unorganised sector, although a public-private partnership policy in this area has not picked up. But infrastructure investment in areas such as rural roads, rural markets, and rural electrification, together with watershed development or minor irrigation programmes, must be carried out mostly through the public investment route. Their effect will be to increase allround efficiency in the rural sector and cause a large expansion of purchasing power, expanding domestic demand.
Expanding the scope of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) can also effectively increase domestic demand. The schemes are supposed to be asset- creating, increasing productive capacity and generating additional purchasing power. If the 100-day cap on employment is removed, and additional funding is provided to those districts which have a number of unfulfilled projects on their shelf, the programme can quickly expand. Even if some of the schemes do not create productive assets as planned and some of the expenditure just leaks out, it will inject purchasing power in the rural areas, multiplying domestic demand.
There is no need to be apologetic about a genuine income transfer to the poor and the vulnerable, the 77 per cent bypassed population. The ultimate aim of development in this context is to improve the welfare of the common people. This will require a programme of social security that provides protection for health and life and accident insurance, maternity benefit, pension and a minimum level of employment insurance to those who had some employment. This will directly impact on their welfare. The NCEUS worked out the details of a minimum social security scheme that will cover more than 360 million unorganised workers, at a cost that will amount to 0.5 per cent of GDP.
The government introduced recently a Bill to meet partially the requirements of a fraction of the unorganised workers. It should have a second look at this scheme and modify it to cover the whole of the unorganised sector within a few years. This will protect the poor and the vulnerable from unforeseen shocks, and insulate them from losing purchasing power.
The income transfer schemes will expand the consumption of the poor and vulnerable 77 per cent of the population, who have high expenditure elasticity for durable goods and ‘essential and other’ non-food items. All of them can be produced by micro-producers in the farm and non-farm sectors, supported by the NAFUS programme.
The Indian responses to the economic crisis have to be different from those of other capitalist countries to their financial crisis. That is not just because the origins of India’s crises are different or because its banking and financial sector is less affected by failures of prudential regulation. The Indian programme should be different because the country has a large domestic economy which has remained neglected when economic growth accelerated. It has been seriously affected by lack of credit and a lack of market. Both these problems can be addressed by domestic policies, independent of international developments. A programme to stimulate this overwhelming unorganised sector of the economy will increase domestic demand and within a short period, domestic production, reviving economic growth. To this must be added the effect of a reduction in poverty and vulnerability feeding back on domestic demand and economic performance. As growth is revived and the confidence in the national economy comes back, we shall overcome the crisis.
(Dr. Arjun Sengupta is a Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha, and Chairman of the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector, G
Friday, June 26, 2009
Pakistani military and the Afghan problem
To be sure, the number 1 priority in the U.S.’s regional policy for the coming 4-8 years is going to be the war in Afghanistan. The Afghan war is a high stakes enterprise in the U.S.’s global strategies. Many profound questions are already intertwined, namely, the entire future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the 21st century, the U.S.’s containment strategy towards Russia, and indeed the efficacy of unilateralism and war as means of conflict resolution.
Yet, there are complexities, which surface fleetingly, but mostly remain invisible to the naked eye. First and foremost, in the present tense phase in Indo-Pak relations, Pakistani military has gently held out that it might be compelled into a redeployment of its nearly 100000-strong crack divisions from Pak-Afghan border regions to eastern border with India. The threat veiled in innuendos has been stunning, cutting deep into the geopolitics.
Simply put, the GHQ in Rawalpindi underscored that if it sniffed, Afghan war will spin out of control. One, all bets are off regarding what General David McKiernan, commander of the U.S. troops in Afghanistan, admitted a few weeks ago as “a shift in thinking at the senior levels in Pakistan that this [Taliban] insurgency is a problem that threatens the very existence of Pakistan, and that they have to deal with it perhaps in ways that they didn’t contemplate a few years ago…a willingness and capacity, although they have a long way to go to conduct counterinsurgency operations on the Pak side of the border.”
We need to factor what went through General McKiernan’s thought process this week. Preserving the Pak top brass’s “shift in thinking” and encouraging its “willingness and capacity” to cooperate with NATO forces will be Washington’s main diplomatic agenda at the moment. Quite obviously, it can’t be otherwise as 32000 American troops are currently deployed in Afghanistan and 20000 more combat and support troops are possibly on their way to the Hindu Kush in the coming weeks.
Two, Pakistani military is literally holding the jugular veins of the NATO as without its troops on the Afghan-Pakistan border, the alliance would be facing the spectre of the Taliban running berserk, which would bring on its trail more armed clashes and death and destruction for western troops. Three, over three quarters of the supplies for the US troops transits through Pakistani territory. The U.S. is unwilling or unable to use alternate Russian or Iranian transit routes. Four, in the absence of Pakistani military presence in the tribal areas, the US will be compelled to press its Special Forces into operations those badlands, which is fraught with frightening downstream consequences.
The geopolitical salient, therefore, remains highly complex. Simply put, the US cannot countenance a nasty Indo-Pak confrontation. The US and Indian interests and concerns at the moment are similar, though their priorities are dissimilar. Clearly, there are serious limits to U.S.’s capacity and willingness to exercise leverage over Pakistan. (Gen. McKiernan also admitted that U.S. and Pakistan militaries are coordinating on the Predator swoops over the tribal areas despite that being a hugely controversial issue in the Pakistani domestic opinion.) All in all, therefore, India needs to engage Pakistan bilaterally at the political and diplomatic level.
No doubt on that score. However, that isn’t all. A contingent of American “experts,” including a few who are distinctly identifiable as cold warriors of the Afghan jihad in the 1980s, have begun coming out of the woodwork lately. They advance the thesis that Afghanistan cannot be stabilized unless Pakistan’s security concerns vis-À-vis India are addressed, namely, the “core issue” of Kashmir, which the incoming Barack Obama administration should mediate. What motivates this melodramatic kite-flying is still unclear or who its real mentors are. There is the haze of a twilight zone with 5 different U.S. agencies – White House, Pentagon, CENTCOM, State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency – ploughing independent furrows toward a new Afghan war strategy. All sorts of wire-pulling and behind-the-scene manipulations are going on in the run-up to the incoming Obama presidency.
Fortunately, except for a few jingoists in our midst who pedalled the idea of an Indian military intervention in the “war on terror” in Afghanistan, we have all along understood that such a course would be an entrapment that would inexorably internationalise the Kashmir issue. Prudence, therefore, continued to prevail in our policy towards Afghanistan.
Indeed, the leitmotif of Pakistan’s Afghan policy has never been Kashmir. Instead, it always was and continues to be the unresolved Pashtun nationality question, which leaves the Durand Line a disputed border with over 8 million Pashtuns straddling it on both sides. To compound, the 100-year treaty, which brought Durand Line into being also lapsed in 1993. Let us remember that the Shah of Iran mediated on the issue, and it was much before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto got the then Afghan Islamist student leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to take up residence in Peshawar to carry out subversive activities against the Kabul regime. India had nothing to do with all this, though by the mid-1990s, we couldn’t take anymore the incessant bleeding engendered by ISI’s hostile activities from militant camps located on Taliban-controlled territory.
In short, unless Kabul recognizes the Durand Line, Pakistan will prefer a weak, disunited Afghanistan. When this entire co-relation is very obvious, the intriguing part is why influential "Afghan experts" – the most glaring is the article in Foreign Affairs magazine by two Pentagon consultants Ahmed Rashid and Barnett Rubin – still pedal the thesis that Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan is driven by its adversarial relationship with India over the Kashmir problem.
Conceivably, these “experts” are worried about Delhi’s Afghan policy in the post-UPA era and aim at rattling Indian nerves by holding out a “Kashmir card.” Or, they intend to pressure Delhi from coordinating with regional powers such as Russia, Iran and the Central Asian republics, which may undercut the U.S. objective of possessing the Hindu Kush as its exclusive geopolitical turf. Of course, Pakistan also stands to lose if a regional consensus on Afghanistan’s stabilization emerges.
Delhi needs to navigate choppy waters. The coming period will be turbulent when the Obama presidency settles in and Washington’s new Afghan strategy is yet to gain traction. What complicates the geopolitical manoeuvring is the underlying reality that Pakistani military remains petrified about Mr. Obama’s Afghan strategy. Mr. Obama subscribes to the Pentagon strategy the US military adopted in Iraq with success in vanquishing Al-Qaeda — “surge” coupled with “Awakening” of Iraqi Sunni tribes.
The Afghan variant of this “kinetic” strategy devolves upon bribing select Pashtun tribes to bear the brunt of the fighting against the large number of insurgent groups, which include the Taliban and the al-Qaeda. The move is controversial as it may let loose more violence and anarchy in the Pashtun tribal areas bordering Pakistan and will likely stoke the fires of Pashtun nationalism. Secondly, Pakistani military will be nervous about Mr. Obama’s tough posturing toward the Pakistani military’s doublespeak on the war — saying one thing and acting contrarily. Mr. Obama has threatened he wouldn’t hesitate ordering US forces move into Pakistani territory if the security situation so warranted.
A third aspect of the US strategy that makes Pakistani military extremely nervous is Washington’s game plan to rapidly build up a 134000-strong Afghan National Army as part of the U.S. “exit strategy.” The Afghan army’s officer corps is predominantly Tajik, who are more professional and motivated in fighting the Pashtun-dominated Taliban.
But, then, Tajik nationalism has always been an obstacle before Pakistani domination of Afghanistan – which largely explained the Pakistani ISI’s deep, irreconcilable hostility toward the late Ahmed Shah Massoud. If the NATO agenda of building up an Afghan army officered by Tajiks really gets under way, that will upturn the entire Pakistani agenda to dominate Afghanistan. As the former Pakistani Foreign Secretary Najmuddin Sheikh (who served under Benazir Bhutto) recently warned, “It would in fact be the realisation of Pakistan’s worst security fears.”
The unstated Pakistani fear is also that the Afghan Tajiks have cordial ties with Russia and Iran – and India. Thus, Pakistani military may need a Plan B, if Mr. Obama gustily plunges into the Pentagon’s new Afghan strategy. A viable Plan B will be based on finding an alibi to disengage from the “war on terror” so that the U.S. strategy doesn’t work, the present stalemate continues, and as the Taliban would say, the Americans keep the watch while time works in favour of the insurgents. India has to be on guard from being projected on to the chessboard as the Pakistani military’s alibi.
(The writer is a former ambassador and an Indian Foreign Service officer.)
Yet, there are complexities, which surface fleetingly, but mostly remain invisible to the naked eye. First and foremost, in the present tense phase in Indo-Pak relations, Pakistani military has gently held out that it might be compelled into a redeployment of its nearly 100000-strong crack divisions from Pak-Afghan border regions to eastern border with India. The threat veiled in innuendos has been stunning, cutting deep into the geopolitics.
Simply put, the GHQ in Rawalpindi underscored that if it sniffed, Afghan war will spin out of control. One, all bets are off regarding what General David McKiernan, commander of the U.S. troops in Afghanistan, admitted a few weeks ago as “a shift in thinking at the senior levels in Pakistan that this [Taliban] insurgency is a problem that threatens the very existence of Pakistan, and that they have to deal with it perhaps in ways that they didn’t contemplate a few years ago…a willingness and capacity, although they have a long way to go to conduct counterinsurgency operations on the Pak side of the border.”
We need to factor what went through General McKiernan’s thought process this week. Preserving the Pak top brass’s “shift in thinking” and encouraging its “willingness and capacity” to cooperate with NATO forces will be Washington’s main diplomatic agenda at the moment. Quite obviously, it can’t be otherwise as 32000 American troops are currently deployed in Afghanistan and 20000 more combat and support troops are possibly on their way to the Hindu Kush in the coming weeks.
Two, Pakistani military is literally holding the jugular veins of the NATO as without its troops on the Afghan-Pakistan border, the alliance would be facing the spectre of the Taliban running berserk, which would bring on its trail more armed clashes and death and destruction for western troops. Three, over three quarters of the supplies for the US troops transits through Pakistani territory. The U.S. is unwilling or unable to use alternate Russian or Iranian transit routes. Four, in the absence of Pakistani military presence in the tribal areas, the US will be compelled to press its Special Forces into operations those badlands, which is fraught with frightening downstream consequences.
The geopolitical salient, therefore, remains highly complex. Simply put, the US cannot countenance a nasty Indo-Pak confrontation. The US and Indian interests and concerns at the moment are similar, though their priorities are dissimilar. Clearly, there are serious limits to U.S.’s capacity and willingness to exercise leverage over Pakistan. (Gen. McKiernan also admitted that U.S. and Pakistan militaries are coordinating on the Predator swoops over the tribal areas despite that being a hugely controversial issue in the Pakistani domestic opinion.) All in all, therefore, India needs to engage Pakistan bilaterally at the political and diplomatic level.
No doubt on that score. However, that isn’t all. A contingent of American “experts,” including a few who are distinctly identifiable as cold warriors of the Afghan jihad in the 1980s, have begun coming out of the woodwork lately. They advance the thesis that Afghanistan cannot be stabilized unless Pakistan’s security concerns vis-À-vis India are addressed, namely, the “core issue” of Kashmir, which the incoming Barack Obama administration should mediate. What motivates this melodramatic kite-flying is still unclear or who its real mentors are. There is the haze of a twilight zone with 5 different U.S. agencies – White House, Pentagon, CENTCOM, State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency – ploughing independent furrows toward a new Afghan war strategy. All sorts of wire-pulling and behind-the-scene manipulations are going on in the run-up to the incoming Obama presidency.
Fortunately, except for a few jingoists in our midst who pedalled the idea of an Indian military intervention in the “war on terror” in Afghanistan, we have all along understood that such a course would be an entrapment that would inexorably internationalise the Kashmir issue. Prudence, therefore, continued to prevail in our policy towards Afghanistan.
Indeed, the leitmotif of Pakistan’s Afghan policy has never been Kashmir. Instead, it always was and continues to be the unresolved Pashtun nationality question, which leaves the Durand Line a disputed border with over 8 million Pashtuns straddling it on both sides. To compound, the 100-year treaty, which brought Durand Line into being also lapsed in 1993. Let us remember that the Shah of Iran mediated on the issue, and it was much before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto got the then Afghan Islamist student leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to take up residence in Peshawar to carry out subversive activities against the Kabul regime. India had nothing to do with all this, though by the mid-1990s, we couldn’t take anymore the incessant bleeding engendered by ISI’s hostile activities from militant camps located on Taliban-controlled territory.
In short, unless Kabul recognizes the Durand Line, Pakistan will prefer a weak, disunited Afghanistan. When this entire co-relation is very obvious, the intriguing part is why influential "Afghan experts" – the most glaring is the article in Foreign Affairs magazine by two Pentagon consultants Ahmed Rashid and Barnett Rubin – still pedal the thesis that Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan is driven by its adversarial relationship with India over the Kashmir problem.
Conceivably, these “experts” are worried about Delhi’s Afghan policy in the post-UPA era and aim at rattling Indian nerves by holding out a “Kashmir card.” Or, they intend to pressure Delhi from coordinating with regional powers such as Russia, Iran and the Central Asian republics, which may undercut the U.S. objective of possessing the Hindu Kush as its exclusive geopolitical turf. Of course, Pakistan also stands to lose if a regional consensus on Afghanistan’s stabilization emerges.
Delhi needs to navigate choppy waters. The coming period will be turbulent when the Obama presidency settles in and Washington’s new Afghan strategy is yet to gain traction. What complicates the geopolitical manoeuvring is the underlying reality that Pakistani military remains petrified about Mr. Obama’s Afghan strategy. Mr. Obama subscribes to the Pentagon strategy the US military adopted in Iraq with success in vanquishing Al-Qaeda — “surge” coupled with “Awakening” of Iraqi Sunni tribes.
The Afghan variant of this “kinetic” strategy devolves upon bribing select Pashtun tribes to bear the brunt of the fighting against the large number of insurgent groups, which include the Taliban and the al-Qaeda. The move is controversial as it may let loose more violence and anarchy in the Pashtun tribal areas bordering Pakistan and will likely stoke the fires of Pashtun nationalism. Secondly, Pakistani military will be nervous about Mr. Obama’s tough posturing toward the Pakistani military’s doublespeak on the war — saying one thing and acting contrarily. Mr. Obama has threatened he wouldn’t hesitate ordering US forces move into Pakistani territory if the security situation so warranted.
A third aspect of the US strategy that makes Pakistani military extremely nervous is Washington’s game plan to rapidly build up a 134000-strong Afghan National Army as part of the U.S. “exit strategy.” The Afghan army’s officer corps is predominantly Tajik, who are more professional and motivated in fighting the Pashtun-dominated Taliban.
But, then, Tajik nationalism has always been an obstacle before Pakistani domination of Afghanistan – which largely explained the Pakistani ISI’s deep, irreconcilable hostility toward the late Ahmed Shah Massoud. If the NATO agenda of building up an Afghan army officered by Tajiks really gets under way, that will upturn the entire Pakistani agenda to dominate Afghanistan. As the former Pakistani Foreign Secretary Najmuddin Sheikh (who served under Benazir Bhutto) recently warned, “It would in fact be the realisation of Pakistan’s worst security fears.”
The unstated Pakistani fear is also that the Afghan Tajiks have cordial ties with Russia and Iran – and India. Thus, Pakistani military may need a Plan B, if Mr. Obama gustily plunges into the Pentagon’s new Afghan strategy. A viable Plan B will be based on finding an alibi to disengage from the “war on terror” so that the U.S. strategy doesn’t work, the present stalemate continues, and as the Taliban would say, the Americans keep the watch while time works in favour of the insurgents. India has to be on guard from being projected on to the chessboard as the Pakistani military’s alibi.
(The writer is a former ambassador and an Indian Foreign Service officer.)
2008 a Year of Turbulence, Strife for Pakistan
By Muhammad Najeeb
Islamabad
The year set to end was one of turbulence for Pakistan, with a virtual war between Islamist militants and the government taking a huge toll and inviting comparisons with failed states.
The year 2008 began with the aftershocks of the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto as she was on the verge of clinching a power sharing deal with then president Pervez Musharraf.
By the time 2008 ended, the first democratically elected government in a decade was in office, headed by Bhutto's husband Asif Ali Zardari. But it found it tough to grapple with escalating militancy that has killed some 600 people in open warfare and unceasing bombings.
If this was not enough, Pakistan's new rulers found themselves under international pressure to come clean on the country's alleged links to the Mumbai terror attack that has derailed relations with India.
In between, President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and their team found themselves facing a severe economic crisis, food shortages and a movement to restore the judges Pervez Musharraf sacked in 2007.
Long-standing friend Washington asked Pakistan to do more to rein in the Taliban and Al Qaeda, which ran wild on the border with Afghanistan. Disgusted with Pakistan's poor response, the US launched air strikes that killed over 120 people, triggering anger in tribal areas.
US officials, from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher to top military commander Admiral Mike Mullen, undertook close to 20 visits to Pakistan, calling upon the leadership to "do more" to root out terrorism.
The pressure was more intense after the audacious Mumbai terror attack Nov 26-29 that killed over 170 people, including 26 foreigners, in India's financial capital.
Pakistani experts believe the situation can be remedied if the government roots out those responsible for escalating terrorism. But that is easier said than done since many terrorist groups are known to enjoy close ties with the Pakistani establishment.
Security expert Khalid Ahmed told IANS: "I believe the urgent issues are extremism, militancy and the security of the Pakistani state... We need to deal with these issues on a priority basis."
Islamabad needs to take "real steps" to arrest the menace of terrorism and extremism with "a shift in where the policy making circles are", he felt.
Retired general Abdul Qayyum disagreed.
"I don't understand what else Pakistan should do; we have done our best. We have arrested people and closed organisations without any evidence. No country in the region is free of terrorism," he maintained.
However, despite repeated assurances by Pakistan, which spends 17.6 percent of its outlay on defence, no immediate solution seems in sight as the Taliban targets the US-led forces in Afghanistan.
Since January, the militants have disrupted supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan. The militants also continue to target civilian and military installations in the country's north.
Scores of schools, seven police stations and several vehicles have been set on fire by the Pakistani Taliban, which are determined to bring about a puritan Islamic state.
"For Pakistan, the priority must be to push back against all militants, not just the ones that the US or India wants us to stamp out," an editorial in the widely respected Dawn newspaper said.
Politically, Zardari's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) formed the government with the help of several parties, including the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). But the PML-Nawaz pulled out of the government on the issue of restoring the Supreme Court judges sacked by Musharraf.
The year 2008 saw unprecedented inflation, with prices of kitchen items and common use commodities rising by almost 30 percent and pushing more people below the poverty line. According to official sources, almost 34.3 percent of the 165 million people now live below the poverty line.
Pakistan also faced a serious balance of payments crisis along with an expanding fiscal deficit. However, after the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released a $7.6 billion bailout package to avoid default on the country's sovereign debt and shore up its foreign currency reserves, the government has initiated efforts to stabilise the economy.
The freezing of the stock market index and extraordinary taxes on property purchases have forced the people, particularly overseas Pakistanis, to pull out their investments from here. Several multinationals are planning to shift investments to other countries mainly because of terror fears and political uncertainty.
Islamabad
The year set to end was one of turbulence for Pakistan, with a virtual war between Islamist militants and the government taking a huge toll and inviting comparisons with failed states.
The year 2008 began with the aftershocks of the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto as she was on the verge of clinching a power sharing deal with then president Pervez Musharraf.
By the time 2008 ended, the first democratically elected government in a decade was in office, headed by Bhutto's husband Asif Ali Zardari. But it found it tough to grapple with escalating militancy that has killed some 600 people in open warfare and unceasing bombings.
If this was not enough, Pakistan's new rulers found themselves under international pressure to come clean on the country's alleged links to the Mumbai terror attack that has derailed relations with India.
In between, President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and their team found themselves facing a severe economic crisis, food shortages and a movement to restore the judges Pervez Musharraf sacked in 2007.
Long-standing friend Washington asked Pakistan to do more to rein in the Taliban and Al Qaeda, which ran wild on the border with Afghanistan. Disgusted with Pakistan's poor response, the US launched air strikes that killed over 120 people, triggering anger in tribal areas.
US officials, from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher to top military commander Admiral Mike Mullen, undertook close to 20 visits to Pakistan, calling upon the leadership to "do more" to root out terrorism.
The pressure was more intense after the audacious Mumbai terror attack Nov 26-29 that killed over 170 people, including 26 foreigners, in India's financial capital.
Pakistani experts believe the situation can be remedied if the government roots out those responsible for escalating terrorism. But that is easier said than done since many terrorist groups are known to enjoy close ties with the Pakistani establishment.
Security expert Khalid Ahmed told IANS: "I believe the urgent issues are extremism, militancy and the security of the Pakistani state... We need to deal with these issues on a priority basis."
Islamabad needs to take "real steps" to arrest the menace of terrorism and extremism with "a shift in where the policy making circles are", he felt.
Retired general Abdul Qayyum disagreed.
"I don't understand what else Pakistan should do; we have done our best. We have arrested people and closed organisations without any evidence. No country in the region is free of terrorism," he maintained.
However, despite repeated assurances by Pakistan, which spends 17.6 percent of its outlay on defence, no immediate solution seems in sight as the Taliban targets the US-led forces in Afghanistan.
Since January, the militants have disrupted supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan. The militants also continue to target civilian and military installations in the country's north.
Scores of schools, seven police stations and several vehicles have been set on fire by the Pakistani Taliban, which are determined to bring about a puritan Islamic state.
"For Pakistan, the priority must be to push back against all militants, not just the ones that the US or India wants us to stamp out," an editorial in the widely respected Dawn newspaper said.
Politically, Zardari's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) formed the government with the help of several parties, including the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). But the PML-Nawaz pulled out of the government on the issue of restoring the Supreme Court judges sacked by Musharraf.
The year 2008 saw unprecedented inflation, with prices of kitchen items and common use commodities rising by almost 30 percent and pushing more people below the poverty line. According to official sources, almost 34.3 percent of the 165 million people now live below the poverty line.
Pakistan also faced a serious balance of payments crisis along with an expanding fiscal deficit. However, after the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released a $7.6 billion bailout package to avoid default on the country's sovereign debt and shore up its foreign currency reserves, the government has initiated efforts to stabilise the economy.
The freezing of the stock market index and extraordinary taxes on property purchases have forced the people, particularly overseas Pakistanis, to pull out their investments from here. Several multinationals are planning to shift investments to other countries mainly because of terror fears and political uncertainty.
Teachers and children
SISTER VALERIE VAN CAUWENBERGHE CSJ
A recent article in a Canadian newspaper (The London Free Press, 15 March 2008) made several interesting comments about children. This article was written during the March school break when children in Ontario schools have a week of holiday. At the outset the writer stated, ‘We do our children a favour by giving them the opportunity to spend a few days at play… It’s called unstructured free time and it’s crucial for a growing mind. All you have to do is look at the face of any child on March break to see proof of their enjoyment. Kids need time away from the regimented grind of school; we all know that.’ I was immediately curious because it is rare that such a comment is made so blatantly by an observer.
And so I read on. ‘Here in North America we pride ourselves on being goal-driven, on being result oriented. So giving children time for free-form thinking and playing is not a priority. There’s school. After school, there are sports or music lessons. In the evenings and on weekends, more structured activities (homework, even for the youngest children, could have been added here). We have even put a structure on play itself – we are, after all, the generation that invented the term "play-date", but assigning a time and place to goof off is the antithesis of childhood fun. This is not a trivial matter. Having a well-developed imagination is important later in life, whether our kids grow up to be editorial writers or security consultants or entrepreneurs.’
I continued to be very impressed by these observational insights until I read the closing sentences. ‘So enjoy the dying hours of March break. A fun pause in the school year, its benefits will be apparent in the years to come.’
When I finished reading the article, I began to reminisce about my teaching career and the events that led me to conclude that play must not be relegated to a week in the winter when school is closed, but that it is essential that play be a vital part of the child’s day at school every day.
My transition from a teacher to a teaching principal, and eventually to a full-time principal in an open area school occurred within twelve years. It was not until I was a full-time principal, however, that I began to reflect on the various approaches of the teachers, particularly those approaches used in the open area of the school. I needed to know more, more about open education generally, and more about young children specifically. This reflection developed into a desire for further education, and I was able to take a sabbatical year at the Institute of Education, London, England, under the auspices of the associate-ship programme for overseas students.
In addition to courses at the institute in the department of child development, I attended a number of ongoing sessions that were offered in various teacher centres in and around the London, England area. These teacher centres offered short courses which focused on specific topics, including the teaching and learning of mathematics and language literacy. At these centres, I met teachers, assistant head teachers, head teachers and inspectors who guided me to a whole host of other pursuits which augmented the network of sources I could tap. That children need various materials and equipment (both indoor and outdoor) in order to learn was, at this time, a relatively new idea for me. The main emphasis in my environs had been on paper and pencil activities, although the revised Department of Education documents in Ontario (1966) and the Hall-Dennis Report (Department of Education, 1968) were strongly suggesting a more active approach to learning.
The work of Susan and Nathan Isaacs, Dorothy Gardiner, Edith Biggs, Robin Tanner, Sir Alex Clegg and the West Riding movement in Yorkshire, England, Lowenfield, Lady Plowden and her report, were all well-known and respected in England, and gradually I began to understand their philosophy and pedagogical stance. I was developing my own implicit theories from talking, reading, listening and sharing with other teachers the explicit theories I was so keen to understand. Their training had been very different from my own. They understood child development well, and indeed the whole country seemed to value children themselves. I had a long way to go to incorporate into classrooms what I had learned and seen in England.
On returning to Ontario, I was assigned a newly created position of primary coordinator, with the responsibility for programmes in the primary division. My first task was to pilot in four classrooms a junior kindergarten project (four year-olds) within a predetermined framework: the physicological, psycho-social and language development of each child. It was to have a Piagetian orientation and, therefore, a philosophy which recognized play as learning. I then proceeded to formulate a definition of play as inclusive of the elements of totality, spontaneity, activity, freedom, choice and engagement (concentration) in an environment which encouraged the child to interact with materials, peers and adults.
At this time the Ontario Ministry of Education was beginning to formalize tests for early identification of children who would be at risk in a school setting. These tests were quite inappropriate for a setting that allowed children to play and to interact freely with adults, peers and materials. The framework referred to above, provided abstract but integrated constructs of learning. It did not provide concepts that were sufficiently concrete for teachers to observe children’s learning readily.
Relying on current available literature, I developed and incorporated ‘The Eleven Indices of Learning’ into the framework. Two major issues that concerned both parents and teachers were teaching children to read as soon as possible and eliminating kindergarten (five year-olds) if the child had been to junior kindergarten or nursery school. The eleventh index of learning ‘symbolizes his/her feelings and ideas through drama, 3-D construction, picture making and print’, and identifies the culmination of all the child’s learning experiences before he or she can read and write (the pre-print years).
From these experiences emerges the print programme. The transition from pre-print to print can be described as a movement from making sense out of the perceptual manipulative world to making sense out of the symbolic abstract world. Not only did the teachers have a more realistic basis for ongoing observation of children at play, but they were enabled to communicate to parents more effectively their observations of the child’s learning, and the significance of the children’s means of expression.
I recognized that the lack of proper in-service training for teachers working with the four year-olds, the practice of providing periodic single focus workshops often unrelated one to the other, and the need for ongoing support for the teacher were critical factors in teacher and programme development. Considerable thought was given to these factors because the programme was to be fully implemented system-wide in three years. The four pilot teachers were released from their classrooms four times during the year for special in service meetings. I also visited the classrooms regularly.
Two important events then occurred. Mary Taylor, a primary education officer with the Ontario Ministry of Education, was seconded to work with me on alternative weeks for a two-year period, and a teacher centre was established in a small five-room house with a basement. In this centre we would carry on two investigations simultaneously. One was to investigate more effective ways of working with teachers, and the other was to find out more about children’s learning through play.
Not only were Mary and I convinced that sporadic and spasmodic workshops encouraged teachers to be dependent on others for knowledge and techniques, we also knew that we had to help teachers become autonomous problem solvers and wise decision-makers. Teachers had to know why they were doing what they were doing. Only then would they have a sense of autonomy over their actions and interactions with children. We also realized that this was a lengthy process. Teachers realized this also, and expressed relief when they were told that it would take from two to five years to make a philosophical change in thinking. Teachers were encouraged not to change anything until they could articulate why they were changing.
Inquiry through interaction in a relaxed atmosphere of respect and trust characterized the centre meetings. Our search into children’s learning allowed the teachers to assume leadership when revealing their observations of children in their classrooms. Because the groups were small (six to eight teachers), it was possible for the interaction between teacher and teacher and teacher and leader to focus on the common goal of finding out more about learning and the learning process.
The half day meetings provided time for expression of strong feelings, debates, discussions (many early discussions centred around guilt, right and wrong), revelations and celebrations. In addition to providing a relaxed atmosphere for discussion, there was also an opportunity for teachers to actively construct and create. Also available was a supply of educational toys and materials for teachers to borrow for as long as she or he felt her/his children were interested.
The teachers’ voluntary and continued involvement with the centre was the real evidence of their commitment. Many of them came to evening sessions. They were encouraged that their input was influencing the direction of the systems primary programme. Of specific significance was the opportunity for release time for all primary teachers (JK to Grade 3), and the provision of fully equipped junior kindergarten and kindergarten classrooms. This included cameras for the teachers to photograph children at play.
When these photos were discussed at meetings, the interaction led to common terminology and increased understanding of the Eleven Indices of Learning. Data on children’s learning was gathered not only from photographs, but also from teachers’ anecdotal records, our notes of the interaction at the centre meetings, and children’s painting files. Analysis of this data revealed a broad, general pattern of children’s learning. With the advent of these signposts of learning, we satisfied the Ontario Ministry of Education guidelines for early and ongoing identification through observation. This pursuit reconfirmed my own implicit theory that children learn through play.
Within three years of the pilot project, the philosophy was influencing the grade one (six year-olds) and grade two (seven year-olds) teachers who developed a document entitled, ‘From Pre-Print to Print’. This document proved to be a useful summary of the transition the child undergoes as she/he becomes a writer and a reader. Principals (Headmasters) of these teachers began to meet at the centre in small groups in order to keep abreast of current developments in understanding children and learning through play. In-service work was also carried on with all the principals at regular intervals throughout the year. Two groups of grade teachers became involved in working on an environmental studies programme statement that would meet the goal requirements of the Ontario Ministry of Education (1975), as well as incorporate the philosophy of learning through play.
In 1978, we attended an international seminar on early childhood in the Scandinavian countries. This gave us an opportunity to share the Scandinavian viewpoint on young children with the teachers at the centre. It also gave further credibility to the philosophy that the teachers were continuing to develop, and provided a long range view of what still must be accomplished before educators/society can meet the needs of children.
Adverse conditions, e.g. large numbers in classrooms, small space, lack of outdoor facilities, busing, all day alternate day junior kindergarten and kindergarten (now the possibility of all day every day is being proposed), disregard for children’s nutritional needs, and so on were brought to the attention of the school officials, but because of the lack of Ontario Ministry of Education guidelines and lack of funds, the Board of Trustees did not respond. These concerns, originating from real situations that individual teachers were experiencing, are the concerns of many teachers, frequently expressed when I travelled throughout Ontario to speak to teachers and which I still hear expressed. The autonomy that the teacher could develop can eventually erode when teachers’ knowledge is ignored.
As the signposts of learning were validated and extended beyond kindergarten, it was evident that suitable materials and equipment were often unavailable to teachers. We decided to rectify this by providing an opportunity for teachers to examine and order materials and books selected for quality and suitability. This additional project became known as the Toy Fair, and helped to equip and maintain primary classrooms. This increase in books and materials allowed teachers to observe greater skill and concept development in the areas of environmental studies and mathematics, reading and writing and the arts.
The teacher centre existed for twelve years. An independent study of the work of the centre by staff from the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education in 1982 stated, ‘…the centre seems to be an unique development unit capable of maintaining professional development over a long period – years – necessary to allow teachers to develop the beliefs, knowledge and attitudes needed in the play approach.’
The closing down of the teacher centre opened a new challenge in my search for professional renewal both for me and for teachers. I asked myself, ‘What about the process of change?’ It then became my intent to design a piece of formal research that would seek to define the process that teachers undergo as they change attitudes, beliefs and acquire new knowledge. Thereby a model for professional renewal could be developed which would enable teachers to become autonomous professionals with their own convictions about learning and with a personal commitment to children.
My analysis of the research, which I subsequently pursued, led me to this conclusion. When teachers and a leader, who are co-participants in a mutually relevant pursuit, engage in a process of inquiry which is activated by the interplay of external and internal forces, they are empowered to form and solve their own challenges. The response is unique to each participant but the process of inquiry, which can be described as a phenomenon of developing competencies over time, is consistent for all participants. The five developmental phases I identified at the conclusion of the research are: changing attitudes and beliefs; acquiring new observational skills; applying new observational skills; from autonomy to initiating observational strategies; and inquiring into a specific focus.
Teachers today are undergoing more stress and tension in their jobs than they were when I was conducting research and working with teachers. Rather because the pace of life is so much faster and probably will continue to escalate, the need to examine closely how to minimize the effects of rapid change in our culture is very important. This should be a topic of concern to school authorities. Children also experience stress and tension although often they do not have either the language or the opportunity to discuss their thoughts and feelings with a sensitive adult because of the pressure of the curriculum or the rush at home. This too should concern both school authorities and parents.
Recently, I travelled to Europe. I talked with young teachers and I visited classrooms during a school fete. I saw the existence of small classrooms, large numbers of young children in these small spaces, lack of materials for hands-on activity and lengthy school days. One young teacher told me that one of her young sons recently asked her on a couple of occasions if she and his father were going to separate. When queried about the reason for the question, the child replied that there were many children in his class who spoke about having two mothers and/or two fathers. How many children worry about this and other matters but do not express their concerns?
In newspapers abroad, the concern about what to do with incompetent teachers was a question school authorities were asking. Perhaps there are some pertinent questions that all those concerned about young children should be asking. Does teacher training recognize the importance of courses on child development and the learning needs of children? Are such courses offered in-depth in faculties of education? How are teachers supported in the system throughout their teaching careers? Does formal testing focus only on the child’s weaknesses rather than his or her strengths? Do standardized tests indicate how best to help specific children? Are authorities listening to the many voices alerting us to very serious consequences of our current education system and calling for change? What is it that makes school and ministerial authorities so impervious to even a discussion with practitioners and interested persons about children and their future?
Baroness Susan Greenfield, Professor of Pharmacology at Oxford University, England, ‘often described as the foremost female scientist in Britain’ (The Independent, 6/4/2008), said in a recent interview that we need, among other things, ‘a major overhaul of education’ to prevent a generation of children becoming emotionally stunted, inarticulate adult hedonists, with tiny attention spans, who can’t differentiate between blasting away aliens on screen and happy-slapping grannies. In her new book, ID: The Quest for Identity in the 21st Century, Professor Greenfield says that people who spend a lot of time interacting through the screen can become emotionally detached, seeing life as a series of logical tasks that demand immediate reaction. Language gets crunched, along with the ability to imagine or analyze. Attention spans shorten. ‘Human beings always listened to stories and had long working memories. Now it’s action, reaction, action, reaction.’
Ever so often a declaration or formal statement is made about children’s rights. In 1976, the General Assembly of the United Nations proclaimed 1979 as the International Year of the Child. Then September 1990 became a possible turning point for children, and therefore for humanity. The World Summit for Children, held under the auspices of the United Nations and co-chaired by Canada brought more than 70 heads of state together to discuss the needs of the world’s children and within two days signed the Principle of the Right of First Call; children have the right to first call on the world’s resources for food, health care and education and these needs should be met first, regardless of the economic vicissitudes of their country. On 26 November 2007, Campaign 2000 released the 2007 Report Card on Child and Family Poverty in Canada, revealing that 18 years after the 1989 all-party resolution of the House of Commons, the child poverty rate is exactly the same.
No one knows the age that lies ahead but we are all related to the process and thereby responsible for the outcome. Someday, perhaps, the child will be the subject of educational pursuits and the curriculum will be the object – not the other way round.
A recent article in a Canadian newspaper (The London Free Press, 15 March 2008) made several interesting comments about children. This article was written during the March school break when children in Ontario schools have a week of holiday. At the outset the writer stated, ‘We do our children a favour by giving them the opportunity to spend a few days at play… It’s called unstructured free time and it’s crucial for a growing mind. All you have to do is look at the face of any child on March break to see proof of their enjoyment. Kids need time away from the regimented grind of school; we all know that.’ I was immediately curious because it is rare that such a comment is made so blatantly by an observer.
And so I read on. ‘Here in North America we pride ourselves on being goal-driven, on being result oriented. So giving children time for free-form thinking and playing is not a priority. There’s school. After school, there are sports or music lessons. In the evenings and on weekends, more structured activities (homework, even for the youngest children, could have been added here). We have even put a structure on play itself – we are, after all, the generation that invented the term "play-date", but assigning a time and place to goof off is the antithesis of childhood fun. This is not a trivial matter. Having a well-developed imagination is important later in life, whether our kids grow up to be editorial writers or security consultants or entrepreneurs.’
I continued to be very impressed by these observational insights until I read the closing sentences. ‘So enjoy the dying hours of March break. A fun pause in the school year, its benefits will be apparent in the years to come.’
When I finished reading the article, I began to reminisce about my teaching career and the events that led me to conclude that play must not be relegated to a week in the winter when school is closed, but that it is essential that play be a vital part of the child’s day at school every day.
My transition from a teacher to a teaching principal, and eventually to a full-time principal in an open area school occurred within twelve years. It was not until I was a full-time principal, however, that I began to reflect on the various approaches of the teachers, particularly those approaches used in the open area of the school. I needed to know more, more about open education generally, and more about young children specifically. This reflection developed into a desire for further education, and I was able to take a sabbatical year at the Institute of Education, London, England, under the auspices of the associate-ship programme for overseas students.
In addition to courses at the institute in the department of child development, I attended a number of ongoing sessions that were offered in various teacher centres in and around the London, England area. These teacher centres offered short courses which focused on specific topics, including the teaching and learning of mathematics and language literacy. At these centres, I met teachers, assistant head teachers, head teachers and inspectors who guided me to a whole host of other pursuits which augmented the network of sources I could tap. That children need various materials and equipment (both indoor and outdoor) in order to learn was, at this time, a relatively new idea for me. The main emphasis in my environs had been on paper and pencil activities, although the revised Department of Education documents in Ontario (1966) and the Hall-Dennis Report (Department of Education, 1968) were strongly suggesting a more active approach to learning.
The work of Susan and Nathan Isaacs, Dorothy Gardiner, Edith Biggs, Robin Tanner, Sir Alex Clegg and the West Riding movement in Yorkshire, England, Lowenfield, Lady Plowden and her report, were all well-known and respected in England, and gradually I began to understand their philosophy and pedagogical stance. I was developing my own implicit theories from talking, reading, listening and sharing with other teachers the explicit theories I was so keen to understand. Their training had been very different from my own. They understood child development well, and indeed the whole country seemed to value children themselves. I had a long way to go to incorporate into classrooms what I had learned and seen in England.
On returning to Ontario, I was assigned a newly created position of primary coordinator, with the responsibility for programmes in the primary division. My first task was to pilot in four classrooms a junior kindergarten project (four year-olds) within a predetermined framework: the physicological, psycho-social and language development of each child. It was to have a Piagetian orientation and, therefore, a philosophy which recognized play as learning. I then proceeded to formulate a definition of play as inclusive of the elements of totality, spontaneity, activity, freedom, choice and engagement (concentration) in an environment which encouraged the child to interact with materials, peers and adults.
At this time the Ontario Ministry of Education was beginning to formalize tests for early identification of children who would be at risk in a school setting. These tests were quite inappropriate for a setting that allowed children to play and to interact freely with adults, peers and materials. The framework referred to above, provided abstract but integrated constructs of learning. It did not provide concepts that were sufficiently concrete for teachers to observe children’s learning readily.
Relying on current available literature, I developed and incorporated ‘The Eleven Indices of Learning’ into the framework. Two major issues that concerned both parents and teachers were teaching children to read as soon as possible and eliminating kindergarten (five year-olds) if the child had been to junior kindergarten or nursery school. The eleventh index of learning ‘symbolizes his/her feelings and ideas through drama, 3-D construction, picture making and print’, and identifies the culmination of all the child’s learning experiences before he or she can read and write (the pre-print years).
From these experiences emerges the print programme. The transition from pre-print to print can be described as a movement from making sense out of the perceptual manipulative world to making sense out of the symbolic abstract world. Not only did the teachers have a more realistic basis for ongoing observation of children at play, but they were enabled to communicate to parents more effectively their observations of the child’s learning, and the significance of the children’s means of expression.
I recognized that the lack of proper in-service training for teachers working with the four year-olds, the practice of providing periodic single focus workshops often unrelated one to the other, and the need for ongoing support for the teacher were critical factors in teacher and programme development. Considerable thought was given to these factors because the programme was to be fully implemented system-wide in three years. The four pilot teachers were released from their classrooms four times during the year for special in service meetings. I also visited the classrooms regularly.
Two important events then occurred. Mary Taylor, a primary education officer with the Ontario Ministry of Education, was seconded to work with me on alternative weeks for a two-year period, and a teacher centre was established in a small five-room house with a basement. In this centre we would carry on two investigations simultaneously. One was to investigate more effective ways of working with teachers, and the other was to find out more about children’s learning through play.
Not only were Mary and I convinced that sporadic and spasmodic workshops encouraged teachers to be dependent on others for knowledge and techniques, we also knew that we had to help teachers become autonomous problem solvers and wise decision-makers. Teachers had to know why they were doing what they were doing. Only then would they have a sense of autonomy over their actions and interactions with children. We also realized that this was a lengthy process. Teachers realized this also, and expressed relief when they were told that it would take from two to five years to make a philosophical change in thinking. Teachers were encouraged not to change anything until they could articulate why they were changing.
Inquiry through interaction in a relaxed atmosphere of respect and trust characterized the centre meetings. Our search into children’s learning allowed the teachers to assume leadership when revealing their observations of children in their classrooms. Because the groups were small (six to eight teachers), it was possible for the interaction between teacher and teacher and teacher and leader to focus on the common goal of finding out more about learning and the learning process.
The half day meetings provided time for expression of strong feelings, debates, discussions (many early discussions centred around guilt, right and wrong), revelations and celebrations. In addition to providing a relaxed atmosphere for discussion, there was also an opportunity for teachers to actively construct and create. Also available was a supply of educational toys and materials for teachers to borrow for as long as she or he felt her/his children were interested.
The teachers’ voluntary and continued involvement with the centre was the real evidence of their commitment. Many of them came to evening sessions. They were encouraged that their input was influencing the direction of the systems primary programme. Of specific significance was the opportunity for release time for all primary teachers (JK to Grade 3), and the provision of fully equipped junior kindergarten and kindergarten classrooms. This included cameras for the teachers to photograph children at play.
When these photos were discussed at meetings, the interaction led to common terminology and increased understanding of the Eleven Indices of Learning. Data on children’s learning was gathered not only from photographs, but also from teachers’ anecdotal records, our notes of the interaction at the centre meetings, and children’s painting files. Analysis of this data revealed a broad, general pattern of children’s learning. With the advent of these signposts of learning, we satisfied the Ontario Ministry of Education guidelines for early and ongoing identification through observation. This pursuit reconfirmed my own implicit theory that children learn through play.
Within three years of the pilot project, the philosophy was influencing the grade one (six year-olds) and grade two (seven year-olds) teachers who developed a document entitled, ‘From Pre-Print to Print’. This document proved to be a useful summary of the transition the child undergoes as she/he becomes a writer and a reader. Principals (Headmasters) of these teachers began to meet at the centre in small groups in order to keep abreast of current developments in understanding children and learning through play. In-service work was also carried on with all the principals at regular intervals throughout the year. Two groups of grade teachers became involved in working on an environmental studies programme statement that would meet the goal requirements of the Ontario Ministry of Education (1975), as well as incorporate the philosophy of learning through play.
In 1978, we attended an international seminar on early childhood in the Scandinavian countries. This gave us an opportunity to share the Scandinavian viewpoint on young children with the teachers at the centre. It also gave further credibility to the philosophy that the teachers were continuing to develop, and provided a long range view of what still must be accomplished before educators/society can meet the needs of children.
Adverse conditions, e.g. large numbers in classrooms, small space, lack of outdoor facilities, busing, all day alternate day junior kindergarten and kindergarten (now the possibility of all day every day is being proposed), disregard for children’s nutritional needs, and so on were brought to the attention of the school officials, but because of the lack of Ontario Ministry of Education guidelines and lack of funds, the Board of Trustees did not respond. These concerns, originating from real situations that individual teachers were experiencing, are the concerns of many teachers, frequently expressed when I travelled throughout Ontario to speak to teachers and which I still hear expressed. The autonomy that the teacher could develop can eventually erode when teachers’ knowledge is ignored.
As the signposts of learning were validated and extended beyond kindergarten, it was evident that suitable materials and equipment were often unavailable to teachers. We decided to rectify this by providing an opportunity for teachers to examine and order materials and books selected for quality and suitability. This additional project became known as the Toy Fair, and helped to equip and maintain primary classrooms. This increase in books and materials allowed teachers to observe greater skill and concept development in the areas of environmental studies and mathematics, reading and writing and the arts.
The teacher centre existed for twelve years. An independent study of the work of the centre by staff from the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education in 1982 stated, ‘…the centre seems to be an unique development unit capable of maintaining professional development over a long period – years – necessary to allow teachers to develop the beliefs, knowledge and attitudes needed in the play approach.’
The closing down of the teacher centre opened a new challenge in my search for professional renewal both for me and for teachers. I asked myself, ‘What about the process of change?’ It then became my intent to design a piece of formal research that would seek to define the process that teachers undergo as they change attitudes, beliefs and acquire new knowledge. Thereby a model for professional renewal could be developed which would enable teachers to become autonomous professionals with their own convictions about learning and with a personal commitment to children.
My analysis of the research, which I subsequently pursued, led me to this conclusion. When teachers and a leader, who are co-participants in a mutually relevant pursuit, engage in a process of inquiry which is activated by the interplay of external and internal forces, they are empowered to form and solve their own challenges. The response is unique to each participant but the process of inquiry, which can be described as a phenomenon of developing competencies over time, is consistent for all participants. The five developmental phases I identified at the conclusion of the research are: changing attitudes and beliefs; acquiring new observational skills; applying new observational skills; from autonomy to initiating observational strategies; and inquiring into a specific focus.
Teachers today are undergoing more stress and tension in their jobs than they were when I was conducting research and working with teachers. Rather because the pace of life is so much faster and probably will continue to escalate, the need to examine closely how to minimize the effects of rapid change in our culture is very important. This should be a topic of concern to school authorities. Children also experience stress and tension although often they do not have either the language or the opportunity to discuss their thoughts and feelings with a sensitive adult because of the pressure of the curriculum or the rush at home. This too should concern both school authorities and parents.
Recently, I travelled to Europe. I talked with young teachers and I visited classrooms during a school fete. I saw the existence of small classrooms, large numbers of young children in these small spaces, lack of materials for hands-on activity and lengthy school days. One young teacher told me that one of her young sons recently asked her on a couple of occasions if she and his father were going to separate. When queried about the reason for the question, the child replied that there were many children in his class who spoke about having two mothers and/or two fathers. How many children worry about this and other matters but do not express their concerns?
In newspapers abroad, the concern about what to do with incompetent teachers was a question school authorities were asking. Perhaps there are some pertinent questions that all those concerned about young children should be asking. Does teacher training recognize the importance of courses on child development and the learning needs of children? Are such courses offered in-depth in faculties of education? How are teachers supported in the system throughout their teaching careers? Does formal testing focus only on the child’s weaknesses rather than his or her strengths? Do standardized tests indicate how best to help specific children? Are authorities listening to the many voices alerting us to very serious consequences of our current education system and calling for change? What is it that makes school and ministerial authorities so impervious to even a discussion with practitioners and interested persons about children and their future?
Baroness Susan Greenfield, Professor of Pharmacology at Oxford University, England, ‘often described as the foremost female scientist in Britain’ (The Independent, 6/4/2008), said in a recent interview that we need, among other things, ‘a major overhaul of education’ to prevent a generation of children becoming emotionally stunted, inarticulate adult hedonists, with tiny attention spans, who can’t differentiate between blasting away aliens on screen and happy-slapping grannies. In her new book, ID: The Quest for Identity in the 21st Century, Professor Greenfield says that people who spend a lot of time interacting through the screen can become emotionally detached, seeing life as a series of logical tasks that demand immediate reaction. Language gets crunched, along with the ability to imagine or analyze. Attention spans shorten. ‘Human beings always listened to stories and had long working memories. Now it’s action, reaction, action, reaction.’
Ever so often a declaration or formal statement is made about children’s rights. In 1976, the General Assembly of the United Nations proclaimed 1979 as the International Year of the Child. Then September 1990 became a possible turning point for children, and therefore for humanity. The World Summit for Children, held under the auspices of the United Nations and co-chaired by Canada brought more than 70 heads of state together to discuss the needs of the world’s children and within two days signed the Principle of the Right of First Call; children have the right to first call on the world’s resources for food, health care and education and these needs should be met first, regardless of the economic vicissitudes of their country. On 26 November 2007, Campaign 2000 released the 2007 Report Card on Child and Family Poverty in Canada, revealing that 18 years after the 1989 all-party resolution of the House of Commons, the child poverty rate is exactly the same.
No one knows the age that lies ahead but we are all related to the process and thereby responsible for the outcome. Someday, perhaps, the child will be the subject of educational pursuits and the curriculum will be the object – not the other way round.
Police Reforms
VED MARWAH
WHY do we need police reforms? Police reforms are not about giving more powers to the police, but to protect life and property of the ordinary citizen and maintain public order. The recent terrorist attack in Mumbai has exposed some glaring loopholes in our security apparatus. Ten armed young men held the commercial capital of the country to ransom for three long days, killing 200 and injuring another 300 persons. The Mumbai police, which once enjoyed the reputation of being the best police force in the country, was found ill-trained and ill-equipped to face the terrorist challenge. It isn’t that Mumbai police was unaware of the lurking danger from the ‘jehadi’ forces from across the border; they were simply unprepared to face the new menace.
Now we know that there were ample warnings about the impending attack, and yet very little was done to thwart it! The ‘laid-back’ attitude of the senior officers and politicization of the police administration are two main causes of the apathy that has crept into the police over a period of time. Shorn of pride and commitment to their job, most police officers are content to serve their political masters. In the process, the enforcers of the rule of law are frequently seen to be on the side of the violators of law.
The police, not only in Mumbai but all over the country, neither have the resources, nor training or motivation to effectively deal with such threats to national security. Arbitrary interference in day-to-day functioning has played havoc with its organization and morale. The command and control in this uniformed disciplined force is under great stress. The ruling parties are directly interfering in their recruitment, posting, transfer and promotions. Beholden to their political masters, the police take less interest in the difficult task of enforcing the rule of law and spend more time in serving their benefactors. Persons with political influence and money have little difficulty in manipulating the police for their own selfish ends. Fear of legal punishment for these persons has virtually disappeared. It is not a coincidence that almost all political parties resist police reforms on one pretext or the other.
In post-independence India due to a shameful record of handling communal violence, endemic corruption, incompetence and resource constraints, the credibility of the police as the enforcer of law has greatly suffered. The police all over the country needs to be backed by cross-party political consensus and a nation-wide mandate to take action against all types of violence and law-breakers.
Terrorism poses the most serious challenge to the unity and integrity of the country. Obviously, a national threat cannot be met by piecemeal response. Zero tolerance for terrorism will remain a rhetorical statement until and unless the police radically improves its performance. And that is not possible without undertaking basic police reforms. The responsibility for the maintenance of internal security primarily lies with the police, but it has been so thoroughly politicized that in the worst insurgency-affected states it is hardly a functional force. For all practical purpose, it has become the ‘armed wing of the ruling party’ in these states. The politician-police-criminal nexus is getting stronger everyday.
The role of the police has undergone major changes since independence, but it continues to function according to the 1861 Police Act. I have been hearing about the need for police reforms since I joined the Indian Police Service in 1956, but hardly anything substantial been done in the last fifty year though peoples’ expectations have gone up.
The new democratically elected rulers are not very different from the colonial masters. In fact, the situation is much worse. They not only use and misuse the police for party purposes, they manipulate it for all sorts of usavoury ends. Corruption and nepotism are the order of the day. The police is not allowed to function in a manner that would instill a feeling of confidence among the people. The government has appointed one commission after another, but their reports have only gathered dust in the government archives for the last fifty years. The National Police Commission (NPC) submitted its last report in 1981, but till date no central government has been willing to implement any of its major recommendations.
Even the Supreme Court directives of September 2006, based on the NPC recommendations, have not found favour with the government. The Supreme Court gave six directions to the state governments and one to the Union government. These directives relate to important facets of the problems faced by the police: insulating it from undue political interference and giving functional autonomy, making it accountable, separating investigation from law and order duties in the metropolitan areas, introducing transparency in the selection of the police chiefs, and giving fixed tenure to officers posted in the field. The central government was also directed to constitute a national security commission to upgrade the effectiveness of the police forces and to improve their working conditions.
A police force raised to meet the requirements of the colonial masters cannot be expected to meet the challenges of modern times. The issue is being wrongly projected as one of empowerment. It is actually one of giving the country a professional police force capable of enforcing the rule of law and protecting life and property of all Indian citizens irrespective of religion, caste or creed. Neither the Centre nor states have till today complied with the directions of the apex court on one pretext or the other. Should we then be surprised if the force is fast losing the confidence of the people? Their credibility is so low that its version of the encounter in Batla House in the Jamia area of New Delhi in September 2008 is not believed by many political leaders and influential sections of the media, even though a Delhi police inspector was shot dead in this encounter.
Contrast this with the credibility of the British police. I was posted as First Secretary in the Indian High Commission in London, when one morning in January 1972 two Pakistani boys brandishing pistols in their hands stormed the India House and took the staff as hostage. They were demanding the release of some Kashmiri youth in Indian prisons. Aldwych, where the High Commission is located, is an important area. A police party reached the place within minutes. Without much warning to the two young men, they shot them dead. It was later discovered that they were carrying only toy guns.
When I enquired from the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Robert Mark, if he required any assistance from the High Commission against possible criticism for the ‘hasty’ police action, his response was a firm ‘no thanks’. He was, in fact, surprised at my offer. He was quite clear in his mind that the police party was justified in doing what they did and that there would be no public criticism. He turned out to be absolutely right. Not one political leader or newspaper even obliquely criticized the police. In fact, The Times editorial praised the police action. Can one imagine such a reaction in India? The entire media and all the opposition parties would be vying with each other in criticizing the police action and in demanding the head of the police officers who fired the shots.
In view of growing violence, extensive social conflicts, and threats like terrorism, the role of the police has assumed great importance. But the Indian policeman is neither recruited nor trained or equipped to perform this role. The First Police Commission in 1902 took a conscious decision to have a ‘cheap’ police force. A constable was expected to perform only routine and unskilled duties. In contrast to the British ‘Bobby’ named after Robert Peel, the father of police reforms in Britain, the 1861 Police Act designed the Indian police as a low-cost unskilled force performing only mechanical duties. The duties of the police officer, as incorporated in Section 23 of the Police Act are ‘to obey and execute all orders and warrants lawfully issued by any competent authority.’
Nowhere does the Act suggest providing service to the people and working closely with them to earn their trust. The new rulers have found the Act useful in manipulating the police for partisan and personal ends by even ignoring the word ‘lawfully’ in actual practice. The Indian Penal Code enacted in 1860, Criminal Procedure Code in 1862 and the Evidence Act in 1872 have given the semi-literate and ill-trained policemen enormous legal powers. Yet, successive governments at the Centre and the state have little enthusiasm for improving their living and working conditions.
A police officer is supposed to be on duty 24 hours without any holiday. He lives away from his family because he has no living accommodation available near the place of work. He is expected to reach a crime scene in minutes, even if he is not provided with transport facilities. Even in metropolitan areas like Delhi and Mumbai, many of them live in ‘jhuggis’ and their living conditions are no better than of the poorest in the society. The media loves to paint them as villains living a life of luxury. While the fact of corruption in their ranks cannot be denied, it is rarely appreciated that over ninety per cent of the force have absolutely no scope for indulging in corruption.
Unfortunately, elitism within the superior ranks has only widened the gap between the field policemen and the supervising officers. The two inhabit very different worlds. A culture of distrust of the subordinate officer has developed over the years. This needs to change if the police are to be an accountable and professional force. Though over time, the requirements from a police constable have undergone a sea change and the tasks entrusted to him are sensitive and complicated, his status has only gone down further. The government continues to compare him with an unskilled Class IV employee. The law gives a constable enormous powers of arrest, search and seizure, but does not pay or train him to do this job.
The police force is also grossly inadequate in numbers to discharge its numerous duties. The police population ratio in India is 1:694 as compared to 1:336 in the US and 1:294 in UK. In fact, this ratio is much higher if we take into account the wastage of force on so-called VIP protection and other duties prioritized by the political rulers that have little to do with their primary role. Moreover, there are large numbers of vacancies in most states. These vacancies have little to do with paucity of funds and more with corruption and nepotism. The many recent recruitment scandals and scams are only the tip of the iceberg. Recruitments are held up till demands for money are met. There are also demands for recruitment on the basis of caste and other considerations. If someone joins the police by paying a bribe or using political links, he can hardly be expected to perform his duties in an impartial manner.
An assessment on the basis of statistics can be deceptive and may differ widely from the prevailing situation on the ground. There is large scale manipulation of data and minimization of crime such that the police statistics offer little help to formulate strategies to control crime. Incidentally, police performance in investigating crime is poor even by its own crime records. There is a lack of professionalism and frequent recourse to short-cuts.
A police officer enjoys immense discretion in the performance of his duties. The powers of arrest and search under Sections 151 and 165 CrPc can be grossly misused under pressure from political masters or for corrupt motives. The lower ranks too have wide discretionary powers under existing law. The organizational dynamics is seriously affected by the manner in which individual officers exercise this discretion in the powers of arrest, search and investigation.
Political control should not mean arbitrary interference in its working. As David Bayley, one of the world’s top experts on police, has succinctly observed – the police can influence political developments by just being deliberately inactive, or selectively active. The political rulers should know that they have no role in day-to-day functioning of the police. There is no place for arbitrary and malafide intervention in the police administration. There are well-set rules notified in the police manuals by state governments about postings, transfers and promotions of officers, but they are being blatantly flouted by many persons in high authority.
Police postings cannot be made subject of political patronage as is the case today. The politicians are interfering even in the investigation of crimes. In important cases, it is they who decide who should be arrested and who not. They decide which complaint should be registered and investigated. Even after a case charge-sheet is submitted in the court, it is not free from political interference. There is pressure not only in the appointment of the senior prosecuting lawyer, but undue interest in how the case is presented in court. There are instances when the prosecution made a complete turnaround in its arguments after a new government at the Centre or the state took office. The cases under trial in the court are often not properly argued by the prosecution because of directions from the new dispensation. Even the premier investigation agency of the country, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), is not free from such allegations.
The much needed reforms in the police and criminal justice system can no longer be postponed. Putting police reforms on fast-track could be a fitting reply to the ever-increasing number of policemen who have lost their lives in fighting terrorists. There is a danger of the whole system collapsing unless immediate steps are taken to bring back credibility to the system in the eyes of the people. Essential reforms for effective policing can be divided in three parts: systemic, personnel, and accountability. They include the elimination of all type of arbitrary and undue external interference in police functioning; improvement in recruitment procedures, training, working and living conditions, equipment, leadership and supervision; but most importantly, to ensure that the police officers are accountable to the Constitution and the people of the country.
Restructuring does not mean only the induction of modern equipment and changes in training and organizational structure, it includes optimization of doctrine and concepts, upgrading human resources, streamlining logistics and modernizing the training methodology and reducing the ‘tail and teeth’ ratio, which at present is too high.
There is need for establishing a countrywide hi-tech network to link all the 14,000 police stations in the country. The Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) should aim at providing the investigating officers with technology, tools and information to facilitate investigation of crime and arrest of criminals. Besides covering all the police stations in the country, it should establish a direct link between the 6,000 senior police offices. Such a system would improve the functioning of police force in the maintenance of law and order, traffic management and prevention of crime, besides keeping track of the progress of cases. The introduction of such a system would also result in the reduction of manual and redundant records-keeping.
In the new economic environment, the police are also becoming a tool in the hands of private corporate houses. The power brokers at the top of the political ladder openly interfere in the posting and transfers of senior police officers. An institution that is no longer in control of itself can hardly be expected to be accountable to the people. The system of punishment through departmental or judicial proceedings is virtually non-functional, due to the complicated procedures laid down by many court judgments. The problem gets further compounded by dilatory tactics of the offending officers, frequent transfers of enquiry officers and excessive workload of routine policing to be handled by the enquiry officers. In fact, punishment is not given to the offending officer but to the enquiry officer. External mechanisms of enforcing accountability hardly operate, and if at all, only ineffectively.
Unfortunately, put on the defensive, organizational culture is strongly resistant to any change. The current system of monitoring and controlling police performance through the District Magistrate is under great stress because of enormous increase in the workload of the DMs. Many district magistrates have allowed themselves to become a link between corrupt politicians and the police to subvert the system, functioning more as a link between the political executive’s publicly proclaimed lofty intentions and privately expressed not so lofty specific instructions. The rich and the powerful have virtual impunity from any legal punishment. A start can at least be made by the Union Home Ministry by introducing the much-needed police reforms in the union territories.
This absurd notion of ‘political correctness’ is seriously affecting the morale of the police and intelligence agencies. They must be insulated from partisan politics. They need more resources, both technical and human, but most of all they need functional autonomy from political interference. Presently, they are accountable to no one except their political masters. Instead of being held accountable for their failures, the incompetent officers are being rewarded, all because they are in the good books of their political masters. The police are required to give a focused response to important aspects of their role like intelligence gathering, data processing, investigation capability, interrogation techniques and operational skills. When the politicians and the police join hands to make room for the mafia dons and terrorists to freely commit acts of terror in exchange for money and muscle power, it is time to be seriously concerned about what is actually happening in many parts of our country.
The difficulty is that only when extortion and kidnapping become frequent and when gang-warfare killings increase, and the terrorists have a free run of the place, that the people, especially the middle class, start feeling insecure. Unfortunately, the government under strong public criticism is more inclined to take the easier option and resort to short-cuts. Instead of tackling the basic problems and strengthening the criminal justice system, it allows the police to combine in itself all the powers of the criminal justice system – that of the investigator, judge and executioner. If this phenomenon of ‘fake encounters’ is to be eliminated, the criminal justice system needs to be put back on the rails. The corrupt and the incompetent should not be allowed to rise to the top, and in no case should they be entrusted with the cutting-edge jobs with greater scope for indulging in corrupt practices. Corruption oversight mechanism, organizational structure, operational response to organized crime and terrorism are some of the issues that need attention.
Clear rules and procedures are laid down in all the state police manuals about the transfer, postings and promotions of subordinate police officers up to the rank of inspector. These rules are routinely flouted by the political rulers. The National Police Commission had made detailed recommendation about the transfer and postings of police officers, and the Supreme Court had issued directions based on these recommendations to the Centre and the state governments in September 2006, but all political parties are united for once in opposing the directive. Though technically, a transfer is not a punishment, in actual practice it can be more than a punishment for the officer concerned.
The politicians have successfully subverted the autonomy of senior bureaucrats by creating a large number of cadre posts with little substantive authority. The basic assumption behind the IAS and the IPS cadre rules, that all posts in a given scale are roughly of equal importance and job content and all the officers in that scale get the same take-home pay and perquisites, is no longer valid. By simple transfer, a minister can effectively give promotion or demotion. After a few penal transfers, officers begin to bend to the unreasonable demands of the politicians. Some do what they are told, others begin to look for protectors. Some seek support of caste and political groups. The concept of a neutral administration treating every citizen irrespective of caste or creed has been subverted like never before.
It is no coincidence that each time a new government takes office in the states or at the Centre, officers holding key posts in the administration, especially in the police, are shifted. New officers appointed to these posts are considered more loyal and pliable. Loyalty to the ruling party plays a role in selection to key posts. Terms like ‘rule of law’ and ‘law will take its own course’ have lost all meaning! All this has led to continuing decline in the quality of administration. The officers consider themselves accountable only to the person who has appointed them. Not accountable to any other authority, they are indifferent to the requirements of the people whom they are expected to serve.
The selection of a DGP should be on the basis of merit and seniority and not for political considerations through a state security commission as recommended by the NPC and directed by the Supreme Court. A police establishment board should be constituted to deal with all transfer, postings and promotions. The SHO, the District SP and the range DIG and IGP should have a fixed tenure, so that they cannot be shuffled around for political considerations. To improve the human resource of the police force at all levels, it is important that constables are reclassified as skilled workers. We cannot have a cheap police force and expect performance of western standards.
A constable is the cutting edge of the force, and yet his working and living conditions are simply awful. They have no housing and very poor medical and transport facilities. They are expected to be on duty twenty-four hours, but are deprived of even the most basic facilities. The rule of twenty-four hours, seven days a week for the policeman was made in the nineteenth century when the subordinate police officers were provided accommodation in the police station complex itself. That is no longer the case today, but police officers in a police station continue to be on duty round the clock, all seven days in a week.
In the twenty-first century, ours is the only country in the world where a police officer is subjected to these inhuman hours of duty. The problem is much worse in the big towns and cities. Even in the capital city of Delhi, a large number of constables living in ‘jhuggis’ far from their place of work, are not provided any transport. The families of policemen are the most neglected in our society. At the same time, there is need for strengthening both internal and external mechanisms to enquire into public complaints against police officers. There is need for a prompt and transparent process of enquiry. The National Police Commission’s recommendation in this regard deserves immediate consideration.
Protection of life and property of its citizens is the foremost responsibility of the state, and it cannot fulfil it unless the police effectively performs its legitimate role. When will our political class understand that while the police cannot be of much help in winning elections, it can by its acts of omission and commission make them lose elections? It is as much in their interest that the police perform its role of enforcing the rule of law in an impartial manner irrespective of class, caste or religion.
* The author was Joint Secretary, National Police Commission on police reforms.
WHY do we need police reforms? Police reforms are not about giving more powers to the police, but to protect life and property of the ordinary citizen and maintain public order. The recent terrorist attack in Mumbai has exposed some glaring loopholes in our security apparatus. Ten armed young men held the commercial capital of the country to ransom for three long days, killing 200 and injuring another 300 persons. The Mumbai police, which once enjoyed the reputation of being the best police force in the country, was found ill-trained and ill-equipped to face the terrorist challenge. It isn’t that Mumbai police was unaware of the lurking danger from the ‘jehadi’ forces from across the border; they were simply unprepared to face the new menace.
Now we know that there were ample warnings about the impending attack, and yet very little was done to thwart it! The ‘laid-back’ attitude of the senior officers and politicization of the police administration are two main causes of the apathy that has crept into the police over a period of time. Shorn of pride and commitment to their job, most police officers are content to serve their political masters. In the process, the enforcers of the rule of law are frequently seen to be on the side of the violators of law.
The police, not only in Mumbai but all over the country, neither have the resources, nor training or motivation to effectively deal with such threats to national security. Arbitrary interference in day-to-day functioning has played havoc with its organization and morale. The command and control in this uniformed disciplined force is under great stress. The ruling parties are directly interfering in their recruitment, posting, transfer and promotions. Beholden to their political masters, the police take less interest in the difficult task of enforcing the rule of law and spend more time in serving their benefactors. Persons with political influence and money have little difficulty in manipulating the police for their own selfish ends. Fear of legal punishment for these persons has virtually disappeared. It is not a coincidence that almost all political parties resist police reforms on one pretext or the other.
In post-independence India due to a shameful record of handling communal violence, endemic corruption, incompetence and resource constraints, the credibility of the police as the enforcer of law has greatly suffered. The police all over the country needs to be backed by cross-party political consensus and a nation-wide mandate to take action against all types of violence and law-breakers.
Terrorism poses the most serious challenge to the unity and integrity of the country. Obviously, a national threat cannot be met by piecemeal response. Zero tolerance for terrorism will remain a rhetorical statement until and unless the police radically improves its performance. And that is not possible without undertaking basic police reforms. The responsibility for the maintenance of internal security primarily lies with the police, but it has been so thoroughly politicized that in the worst insurgency-affected states it is hardly a functional force. For all practical purpose, it has become the ‘armed wing of the ruling party’ in these states. The politician-police-criminal nexus is getting stronger everyday.
The role of the police has undergone major changes since independence, but it continues to function according to the 1861 Police Act. I have been hearing about the need for police reforms since I joined the Indian Police Service in 1956, but hardly anything substantial been done in the last fifty year though peoples’ expectations have gone up.
The new democratically elected rulers are not very different from the colonial masters. In fact, the situation is much worse. They not only use and misuse the police for party purposes, they manipulate it for all sorts of usavoury ends. Corruption and nepotism are the order of the day. The police is not allowed to function in a manner that would instill a feeling of confidence among the people. The government has appointed one commission after another, but their reports have only gathered dust in the government archives for the last fifty years. The National Police Commission (NPC) submitted its last report in 1981, but till date no central government has been willing to implement any of its major recommendations.
Even the Supreme Court directives of September 2006, based on the NPC recommendations, have not found favour with the government. The Supreme Court gave six directions to the state governments and one to the Union government. These directives relate to important facets of the problems faced by the police: insulating it from undue political interference and giving functional autonomy, making it accountable, separating investigation from law and order duties in the metropolitan areas, introducing transparency in the selection of the police chiefs, and giving fixed tenure to officers posted in the field. The central government was also directed to constitute a national security commission to upgrade the effectiveness of the police forces and to improve their working conditions.
A police force raised to meet the requirements of the colonial masters cannot be expected to meet the challenges of modern times. The issue is being wrongly projected as one of empowerment. It is actually one of giving the country a professional police force capable of enforcing the rule of law and protecting life and property of all Indian citizens irrespective of religion, caste or creed. Neither the Centre nor states have till today complied with the directions of the apex court on one pretext or the other. Should we then be surprised if the force is fast losing the confidence of the people? Their credibility is so low that its version of the encounter in Batla House in the Jamia area of New Delhi in September 2008 is not believed by many political leaders and influential sections of the media, even though a Delhi police inspector was shot dead in this encounter.
Contrast this with the credibility of the British police. I was posted as First Secretary in the Indian High Commission in London, when one morning in January 1972 two Pakistani boys brandishing pistols in their hands stormed the India House and took the staff as hostage. They were demanding the release of some Kashmiri youth in Indian prisons. Aldwych, where the High Commission is located, is an important area. A police party reached the place within minutes. Without much warning to the two young men, they shot them dead. It was later discovered that they were carrying only toy guns.
When I enquired from the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Robert Mark, if he required any assistance from the High Commission against possible criticism for the ‘hasty’ police action, his response was a firm ‘no thanks’. He was, in fact, surprised at my offer. He was quite clear in his mind that the police party was justified in doing what they did and that there would be no public criticism. He turned out to be absolutely right. Not one political leader or newspaper even obliquely criticized the police. In fact, The Times editorial praised the police action. Can one imagine such a reaction in India? The entire media and all the opposition parties would be vying with each other in criticizing the police action and in demanding the head of the police officers who fired the shots.
In view of growing violence, extensive social conflicts, and threats like terrorism, the role of the police has assumed great importance. But the Indian policeman is neither recruited nor trained or equipped to perform this role. The First Police Commission in 1902 took a conscious decision to have a ‘cheap’ police force. A constable was expected to perform only routine and unskilled duties. In contrast to the British ‘Bobby’ named after Robert Peel, the father of police reforms in Britain, the 1861 Police Act designed the Indian police as a low-cost unskilled force performing only mechanical duties. The duties of the police officer, as incorporated in Section 23 of the Police Act are ‘to obey and execute all orders and warrants lawfully issued by any competent authority.’
Nowhere does the Act suggest providing service to the people and working closely with them to earn their trust. The new rulers have found the Act useful in manipulating the police for partisan and personal ends by even ignoring the word ‘lawfully’ in actual practice. The Indian Penal Code enacted in 1860, Criminal Procedure Code in 1862 and the Evidence Act in 1872 have given the semi-literate and ill-trained policemen enormous legal powers. Yet, successive governments at the Centre and the state have little enthusiasm for improving their living and working conditions.
A police officer is supposed to be on duty 24 hours without any holiday. He lives away from his family because he has no living accommodation available near the place of work. He is expected to reach a crime scene in minutes, even if he is not provided with transport facilities. Even in metropolitan areas like Delhi and Mumbai, many of them live in ‘jhuggis’ and their living conditions are no better than of the poorest in the society. The media loves to paint them as villains living a life of luxury. While the fact of corruption in their ranks cannot be denied, it is rarely appreciated that over ninety per cent of the force have absolutely no scope for indulging in corruption.
Unfortunately, elitism within the superior ranks has only widened the gap between the field policemen and the supervising officers. The two inhabit very different worlds. A culture of distrust of the subordinate officer has developed over the years. This needs to change if the police are to be an accountable and professional force. Though over time, the requirements from a police constable have undergone a sea change and the tasks entrusted to him are sensitive and complicated, his status has only gone down further. The government continues to compare him with an unskilled Class IV employee. The law gives a constable enormous powers of arrest, search and seizure, but does not pay or train him to do this job.
The police force is also grossly inadequate in numbers to discharge its numerous duties. The police population ratio in India is 1:694 as compared to 1:336 in the US and 1:294 in UK. In fact, this ratio is much higher if we take into account the wastage of force on so-called VIP protection and other duties prioritized by the political rulers that have little to do with their primary role. Moreover, there are large numbers of vacancies in most states. These vacancies have little to do with paucity of funds and more with corruption and nepotism. The many recent recruitment scandals and scams are only the tip of the iceberg. Recruitments are held up till demands for money are met. There are also demands for recruitment on the basis of caste and other considerations. If someone joins the police by paying a bribe or using political links, he can hardly be expected to perform his duties in an impartial manner.
An assessment on the basis of statistics can be deceptive and may differ widely from the prevailing situation on the ground. There is large scale manipulation of data and minimization of crime such that the police statistics offer little help to formulate strategies to control crime. Incidentally, police performance in investigating crime is poor even by its own crime records. There is a lack of professionalism and frequent recourse to short-cuts.
A police officer enjoys immense discretion in the performance of his duties. The powers of arrest and search under Sections 151 and 165 CrPc can be grossly misused under pressure from political masters or for corrupt motives. The lower ranks too have wide discretionary powers under existing law. The organizational dynamics is seriously affected by the manner in which individual officers exercise this discretion in the powers of arrest, search and investigation.
Political control should not mean arbitrary interference in its working. As David Bayley, one of the world’s top experts on police, has succinctly observed – the police can influence political developments by just being deliberately inactive, or selectively active. The political rulers should know that they have no role in day-to-day functioning of the police. There is no place for arbitrary and malafide intervention in the police administration. There are well-set rules notified in the police manuals by state governments about postings, transfers and promotions of officers, but they are being blatantly flouted by many persons in high authority.
Police postings cannot be made subject of political patronage as is the case today. The politicians are interfering even in the investigation of crimes. In important cases, it is they who decide who should be arrested and who not. They decide which complaint should be registered and investigated. Even after a case charge-sheet is submitted in the court, it is not free from political interference. There is pressure not only in the appointment of the senior prosecuting lawyer, but undue interest in how the case is presented in court. There are instances when the prosecution made a complete turnaround in its arguments after a new government at the Centre or the state took office. The cases under trial in the court are often not properly argued by the prosecution because of directions from the new dispensation. Even the premier investigation agency of the country, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), is not free from such allegations.
The much needed reforms in the police and criminal justice system can no longer be postponed. Putting police reforms on fast-track could be a fitting reply to the ever-increasing number of policemen who have lost their lives in fighting terrorists. There is a danger of the whole system collapsing unless immediate steps are taken to bring back credibility to the system in the eyes of the people. Essential reforms for effective policing can be divided in three parts: systemic, personnel, and accountability. They include the elimination of all type of arbitrary and undue external interference in police functioning; improvement in recruitment procedures, training, working and living conditions, equipment, leadership and supervision; but most importantly, to ensure that the police officers are accountable to the Constitution and the people of the country.
Restructuring does not mean only the induction of modern equipment and changes in training and organizational structure, it includes optimization of doctrine and concepts, upgrading human resources, streamlining logistics and modernizing the training methodology and reducing the ‘tail and teeth’ ratio, which at present is too high.
There is need for establishing a countrywide hi-tech network to link all the 14,000 police stations in the country. The Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) should aim at providing the investigating officers with technology, tools and information to facilitate investigation of crime and arrest of criminals. Besides covering all the police stations in the country, it should establish a direct link between the 6,000 senior police offices. Such a system would improve the functioning of police force in the maintenance of law and order, traffic management and prevention of crime, besides keeping track of the progress of cases. The introduction of such a system would also result in the reduction of manual and redundant records-keeping.
In the new economic environment, the police are also becoming a tool in the hands of private corporate houses. The power brokers at the top of the political ladder openly interfere in the posting and transfers of senior police officers. An institution that is no longer in control of itself can hardly be expected to be accountable to the people. The system of punishment through departmental or judicial proceedings is virtually non-functional, due to the complicated procedures laid down by many court judgments. The problem gets further compounded by dilatory tactics of the offending officers, frequent transfers of enquiry officers and excessive workload of routine policing to be handled by the enquiry officers. In fact, punishment is not given to the offending officer but to the enquiry officer. External mechanisms of enforcing accountability hardly operate, and if at all, only ineffectively.
Unfortunately, put on the defensive, organizational culture is strongly resistant to any change. The current system of monitoring and controlling police performance through the District Magistrate is under great stress because of enormous increase in the workload of the DMs. Many district magistrates have allowed themselves to become a link between corrupt politicians and the police to subvert the system, functioning more as a link between the political executive’s publicly proclaimed lofty intentions and privately expressed not so lofty specific instructions. The rich and the powerful have virtual impunity from any legal punishment. A start can at least be made by the Union Home Ministry by introducing the much-needed police reforms in the union territories.
This absurd notion of ‘political correctness’ is seriously affecting the morale of the police and intelligence agencies. They must be insulated from partisan politics. They need more resources, both technical and human, but most of all they need functional autonomy from political interference. Presently, they are accountable to no one except their political masters. Instead of being held accountable for their failures, the incompetent officers are being rewarded, all because they are in the good books of their political masters. The police are required to give a focused response to important aspects of their role like intelligence gathering, data processing, investigation capability, interrogation techniques and operational skills. When the politicians and the police join hands to make room for the mafia dons and terrorists to freely commit acts of terror in exchange for money and muscle power, it is time to be seriously concerned about what is actually happening in many parts of our country.
The difficulty is that only when extortion and kidnapping become frequent and when gang-warfare killings increase, and the terrorists have a free run of the place, that the people, especially the middle class, start feeling insecure. Unfortunately, the government under strong public criticism is more inclined to take the easier option and resort to short-cuts. Instead of tackling the basic problems and strengthening the criminal justice system, it allows the police to combine in itself all the powers of the criminal justice system – that of the investigator, judge and executioner. If this phenomenon of ‘fake encounters’ is to be eliminated, the criminal justice system needs to be put back on the rails. The corrupt and the incompetent should not be allowed to rise to the top, and in no case should they be entrusted with the cutting-edge jobs with greater scope for indulging in corrupt practices. Corruption oversight mechanism, organizational structure, operational response to organized crime and terrorism are some of the issues that need attention.
Clear rules and procedures are laid down in all the state police manuals about the transfer, postings and promotions of subordinate police officers up to the rank of inspector. These rules are routinely flouted by the political rulers. The National Police Commission had made detailed recommendation about the transfer and postings of police officers, and the Supreme Court had issued directions based on these recommendations to the Centre and the state governments in September 2006, but all political parties are united for once in opposing the directive. Though technically, a transfer is not a punishment, in actual practice it can be more than a punishment for the officer concerned.
The politicians have successfully subverted the autonomy of senior bureaucrats by creating a large number of cadre posts with little substantive authority. The basic assumption behind the IAS and the IPS cadre rules, that all posts in a given scale are roughly of equal importance and job content and all the officers in that scale get the same take-home pay and perquisites, is no longer valid. By simple transfer, a minister can effectively give promotion or demotion. After a few penal transfers, officers begin to bend to the unreasonable demands of the politicians. Some do what they are told, others begin to look for protectors. Some seek support of caste and political groups. The concept of a neutral administration treating every citizen irrespective of caste or creed has been subverted like never before.
It is no coincidence that each time a new government takes office in the states or at the Centre, officers holding key posts in the administration, especially in the police, are shifted. New officers appointed to these posts are considered more loyal and pliable. Loyalty to the ruling party plays a role in selection to key posts. Terms like ‘rule of law’ and ‘law will take its own course’ have lost all meaning! All this has led to continuing decline in the quality of administration. The officers consider themselves accountable only to the person who has appointed them. Not accountable to any other authority, they are indifferent to the requirements of the people whom they are expected to serve.
The selection of a DGP should be on the basis of merit and seniority and not for political considerations through a state security commission as recommended by the NPC and directed by the Supreme Court. A police establishment board should be constituted to deal with all transfer, postings and promotions. The SHO, the District SP and the range DIG and IGP should have a fixed tenure, so that they cannot be shuffled around for political considerations. To improve the human resource of the police force at all levels, it is important that constables are reclassified as skilled workers. We cannot have a cheap police force and expect performance of western standards.
A constable is the cutting edge of the force, and yet his working and living conditions are simply awful. They have no housing and very poor medical and transport facilities. They are expected to be on duty twenty-four hours, but are deprived of even the most basic facilities. The rule of twenty-four hours, seven days a week for the policeman was made in the nineteenth century when the subordinate police officers were provided accommodation in the police station complex itself. That is no longer the case today, but police officers in a police station continue to be on duty round the clock, all seven days in a week.
In the twenty-first century, ours is the only country in the world where a police officer is subjected to these inhuman hours of duty. The problem is much worse in the big towns and cities. Even in the capital city of Delhi, a large number of constables living in ‘jhuggis’ far from their place of work, are not provided any transport. The families of policemen are the most neglected in our society. At the same time, there is need for strengthening both internal and external mechanisms to enquire into public complaints against police officers. There is need for a prompt and transparent process of enquiry. The National Police Commission’s recommendation in this regard deserves immediate consideration.
Protection of life and property of its citizens is the foremost responsibility of the state, and it cannot fulfil it unless the police effectively performs its legitimate role. When will our political class understand that while the police cannot be of much help in winning elections, it can by its acts of omission and commission make them lose elections? It is as much in their interest that the police perform its role of enforcing the rule of law in an impartial manner irrespective of class, caste or religion.
* The author was Joint Secretary, National Police Commission on police reforms.
Planning then and Now
MONTEK SINGH AHLUWALIA
A question frequently asked today is whether planning has any relevance in a world of economic liberalization and the market economy. The short answer is that it does, but not the kind of planning we practised in the past which derived its rationale from the belief that centralized control on resource allocation, with extensive intervention in private sector decision-making, was necessary to achieve rapid growth.
Amartya Sen’s article, which is reprinted in this volume but which first appeared in the Seminar issue on Freedom and Planning almost fifty years ago, provides a flavour of the earlier approach. Sen argued then that planning was necessary not only to achieve distributional objectives – which he points out is a traditional and much discussed basis for state intervention – but also to achieve a high rate of growth. He recognized that the industrialized world had achieved industrialization without planning and acknowledged that we could also follow this path, but warned that if we did, it would take us more than a hundred years to industrialize whereas the experience of the socialist economies showed that a much faster transition was possible with socialist planning.
The superiority of socialism in achieving rapid growth was attributed to two reasons. First, since capitalists seek profit maximization, growth in a capitalist economy is only a by-product of this process, and therefore need not occur at the fastest possible rate. Second, even if capitalists want to maximize growth, they would be less efficient at doing so because individual entrepreneurs do not have all the information necessary to achieve the best results whereas a ‘national coordinating planning organization’ would have much more information and therefore achieve better ground outcomes.
Sen also warned that planning as practised in India, without a really socialist economy, with a private sector responsible for producing consumer goods and a public sector concentrating on producer goods, was unlikely to achieve results. The model suffered from internal contradictions – the ‘middle path’, as he put it, had run out and it was necessary to take a stand on whether we really wanted a socialist economy. The case for planning was essentially a case for more comprehensive socialism, and was in his view a strong case, but we would need to move to a socialist economy.
Things have changed enormously in fifty years and not surprisingly attitudes to planning have also changed. The greatest change in perceptions that has occurred since Sen’s Seminar article of fifty years ago is the discrediting of the technical argument that a centralized planning system, led by a ‘a coordinating national planning organization’ would be more able to achieve faster growth. The costs of a centralized system of decision-making, relative to a decentralized approach of ‘letting a hundred flowers bloom’ are now much better appreciated. Centralization is of course particularly dangerous where governance is poor but even when governance is not a serious problem, centralization is likely to be inefficient because bureaucratic decision-making, subject to multiple levels of accountability, is inherently sluggish, rule bound and unlikely to promote risk-taking. It suffers from greater inertia being less likely to acknowledge mistakes and change course when evidence begins to suggest that it should.
Paradoxically, democratic governments are actually much more burdened than authoritarian regimes in this respect, because accountability in a competitive political environment often leads to dilatory procedures designed to ensure transparency and is vulnerable to constant challenges on grounds of bias and ill-intention. This in turn suggests that our democratic system is likely to yield a better economic performance, if it relies on an economy with greater reliance on market forces, rather than one subject to constant political interference.
Another important change in the plan is that the experience of the socialist countries does not point in the same direction as it did sixty years ago. Communism collapsed first in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and then in the erstwhile Soviet Union in 1990. Even more directly relevant for our circumstances is the transformation in economic policy brought about by the Communist Party of China, especially after 1984 (later imitated by Vietnam) which suggests that the way to rapid growth in a developing country is more likely to lie in liberalizing economic policy, embracing market forces and encouraging the private sector rather than moving from the mixed economy to something closer to socialism and socialist planning.
Sen proved prescient, however, in the doubts he expressed in 1959 about the effectiveness of planning as practised in India and his misgivings were largely borne out over the next twenty years. Indian planning did not succeed in achieving even moderate targets of five per cent growth set in the early five year plans. Doubts also began to be aired about whether such growth as was taking place was reaching the poor. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru himself, while introducing the Third Plan in Parliament in August 1962, said that per capita income had increased but ‘a legitimate query is made. Where has this gone?’ He went on to observe that he could see that people were better fed and clothed but ‘that does not apply to everyone. Some people have hardly benefited. Some people may even be experiencing various difficulties.’
The need to focus on delivering benefits to the common man led the Indian Planning Commission to prepare a Perspective Plan aimed at bringing everyone up to a minimum level of living within 15 years from 1961 to 1976. The Planning Commission strategy document concluded that because the benefits of growth do not flow equally to all sections, this objective could be achieved for the third decile from the bottom, if the economy grew at an average rate of seven per cent per year over the period. However, even with growth at this rate, which was judged to be feasible, the poorest two deciles would not benefit sufficiently to reach the minimum. Special income transfer mechanisms would be needed to bring this group to the minimum level, but this could be managed without disrupting the growth process.
As it happened, economic performance fell well short of the seven per cent target. The average growth rate in the period 1960 to 1980 was only 3.5 per cent per year, famously described by the late Professor Raj Krishna as ‘the Hindu rate of growth’. Interestingly, the failure on the growth front did not lead, as it should have, to questioning the growth strategy itself. That came much later, though the basic weakness was precisely the one identified in Sen’s article – an effort to control private sector activity excessively leads to conflicting incentives. Initially, the response of the planners was to accept the low growth performance as unavoidable and to shift the emphasis on anti-poverty schemes. This approach had little effect on poverty.
India’s growth performance improved significantly in the 1980s when the economy grew at an average of 5-6 per cent per year. Interestingly, this was not because we became more socialist, but because we learnt from the experience of other countries in East Asia and started to liberalize and give greater play to the market. These trends were initiated in the mid 1980s, when the government became much less suspicious and more supportive of the private sector. The existing framework of controls was not dismantled, but it was administered more liberally.
A much more explicit change in policy occurred after 1991, with an explicit acceptance of the need to bring about a systemic change, albeit in a gradualist fashion. The private sector was freed of much of the stifling controls that had been evolved over many years in the name of planning and rational allocation of scarce resources. Much greater room was allowed for entrepreneurs to respond freely to market forces with greater reliance on competition to increase efficiency. The economy was also opened gradually to foreign trade and foreign capital.
Was this a dismantling of planning? Not if one takes the view that the purpose of planning is to put in place policies that seek to exploit the growth potential of the economy and to push it to achieve stated developmental goals. The change in policy was a considered response and the trend has continued despite changes in government. The new approach to policy is evident not only in the Centre but also in the states. The results in terms of economic growth have been impressive, comprehensively refuting the critics who argued that the changes would lead to a collapse in performance and perpetual foreign exchange crises. The average growth rate achieved in the Tenth Plan 2002-03 to 2006-07 was 7.6 per cent per year, marginally short of the target of eight per cent and a very far cry from the so called Hindu rate of growth. The past four years 2004-05 to 2007-08 have seen an average growth rate of close to nine per cent.
Growth is expected to slow down in 2008-09 to around eight per cent or possibly even a little lower and there has been much focus on this deceleration in the press. However, cyclical variations in growth are normal and would still represent an impressive performance in a year when the world economy is slowing down significantly. Most observers agree that India is well set on the path of rapid growth and the Eleventh Plan target of averaging nine per cent growth per year and setting the economy at a 10 per cent growth path by the end of the plan period is eminently achievable, provided supportive policies outlined in the Eleventh Plan are put in place.
The record is less impressive when we focus on distributional outcomes and this is rightly a major concern of policy today. The percentage of the population below the poverty line is falling, but far too slowly. Child malnutrition is very high at 40 per cent in 2005-06, with micro-nutrient deficiencies being even higher. Health facilities available to the population are well below what is needed and access to quality education is still limited, especially in rural areas. The recently approved Eleventh Plan recognizes these deficiencies and explicitly sets its objectives in terms of ‘inclusive growth’. The plan aims at an average growth rate of nine per cent rising to 10 per cent at the end of the plan period. In addition, to the traditional growth target it also sets 26 other targets for indicators of social development.
This brings us to the question, what sort of planning do we need to achieve these objectives? First we must recognise that the instruments of planning must be very different in a market economy that is increasingly integrated with the world. We do not need to set objectives in terms of detailed output targets emerging from multi-sector input output based models of the economy and then try to direct private investment to meet these sub-sectoral growth projections. Sectoral balances aimed at matching demand and supply in 200 sub-sectors used to be the staple of planning exercises in India, but they are meaningless for sectors where the output is importable and foreign trade is liberalized because any excess demand for a particular product can be made good by imports. The planning problem is in effect reduced to the problem of managing the resulting balance of payments.
This is one problem we have actually handled very well. The liberalization of the past fifteen years has clearly established that it is not necessary to control imports as we used to in order to manage the balance of payments. In fact, the complex system of import controls that was ostensibly designed to conserve scarce foreign exchange, actually served only to provide open-ended protection for domestic producers against foreign competition. It led to a high cost and low quality domestic production structure, which in turn reduced India’s capacity to produce exportable quality products at competitive prices. It also promoted extensive corruption associated with running a complex and highly discretionary import control system.
The inappropriateness of import controls in a world of fast changing technology is best illustrated by the experience of Infosys related to me by its founder Chairman, N.R. Narayanamurthy. According to him, Infosys, in the late 1980s applied for a license to import a particular Hewlett Packard computer and received a license specifying the model number. The process took six months and by the time the license was received by the company, HP had come out with a later version having a larger capacity and a lower price. However, Infosys could not import this product against the license because the product had a different model number. Infosys was told it would have to get a fresh license, which would of course take another six months and no one could say what would happen if computer models changed again! We certainly could not possibly have achieved what we have in software if government policies had not changed.
It is worth noting that ever since we adopted import liberalization and a market driven exchange rate in 1993 – a shift that was accompanied by a cacophony of warnings that liberalization would bring a balance of payments crisis – we have actually never had a foreign exchange crisis! The problem, if anything has been the reverse. We have had a surplus of foreign exchange and are debating how best to use it.
Was this liberalization a dismantling of planning? Not really, unless we mistake particular instruments of control for planning. It was in fact a recognition that good planning involves putting in place policies that will allow the economy to perform to its full potential and a private sector dominated economy needs to give much greater freedom to private enterprise within the framework of a competitive economy. This is not to say that reliance on markets will take care of all objectives. It will not take care of distributional objectives since not everyone will benefit sufficiently from exclusive reliance on markets. It also does not take care of market failures, which warrant corrective action. These problems need to be addressed through carefully crafted policies and programmes involving suitably designed government intervention at multiple levels. There is also a role for planning to sketch out a broad perspective of the economy evolving over a longer term which can be called indicative planning.
By indicative planning, I mean defining broad national goals and objectives, and presenting an internally consistent picture of the evolution of the economy in a manner which achieves these national over a defined time horizon. In India, for example, if we could set the goal of achieving some target level of per capita income over a specified period – say increasing our per capita income from $1000 today to $5000 over 20 years combined with corresponding improvements in the access of the population to a basic minimum level of living over this period. Indicative planning can then be used to outline broad challenges in achieving this goal.
If population growth over this period averages say 1.3 per cent per year, then GDP will have to grow at an average rate of about 10 per cent per year for per capita income to reach $5000 in 20 years. It is a legitimate planning exercise to explore the medium to longer term implications of such growth to identify some of the major challenges it poses.
We do not need to develop detailed multi-sector models looking for precise estimates of the domestic production requirement of individual commodities and the inputs needed for them. However, we do need to examine broad areas of feasibility in terms of the levels of domestic savings and investment needed for this growth, the financial structure and investment climate which that requires in an economy driven by the private sector and open to the world, the implications of such growth for India’s interaction with the rest of the world, and finally the effort we need to make to develop the technological capacity to help achieve our national objectives. If India is to become the country with the third largest GDP in the world after China and the USA (in that order), it is relevant to ask what is the nature and quality of our educational and scientific institutions and the interaction between our private corporations and research and development consistent with this goal.
Indicative planning can help to highlight the longer term structural changes that are likely to arise as a consequence of such growth and the challenges they pose in terms of action to be taken sufficiently in advance. For example, what would a 10 per cent growth, and the growth of manufacturing of around 14 per cent per year, mean in terms of the pace of urbanization and are our systems for urban planning capable of responding to this challenge? If our urban population over this period increases by about 150 million, are our urban systems of government, and their financial arrangements, capable of supporting such an expansion especially considering the enormous improvement needed in the quality of urban infrastructure? What are the energy requirements of such growth and can they be met from available energy sources with a modicum of assurance of energy security? If the price of conventional energy is expected to rise sharply will this affect our growth potential and can we take steps to minimize this effect? As pointed out earlier, we do not need to worry about ensuring adequate sectoral supplies of most items that are importable, but we do need to worry about tradable goods such as petroleum and coal which though importable are likely to become globally scarce, and therefore very high priced.
Planning is also needed to ensure adequate growth in domestic capacity in the non-tradable sector, where imports are not an option. This includes development of most basic infrastructure such as roads, ports, airports, telecommunications, electricity and also basic urban infrastructure, including water supply and sewerage. In all these areas, investments involve considerable resources and long time-lags and often require government initiative and support. It is necessary to define the tasks before the government (both Centre and the states) well in advance and to take steps now for the future.
Indicative planning can draw attention to critical areas and identify difficult policy choices for overall goals to be achieved, but it does not necessarily have to specify precise targets and instruments for achieving these goals. Often its role is to draw attention to the problems, indicate a broad direction for the solution and stimulate debate and discussion overcoming these problems, a debate in which numerous stakeholders get involved before workable policies are implemented.
To be relevant, planning today also has to recognize that the private sector, which includes farmers, small enterprises and organized industry, accounts for 75 per cent of total investment and the dynamism of this sector is therefore a critical determinant of overall economic performance. Planning in this environment has to be based on the assumption that decisions in individual firms and farms have to be left to individual entrepreneurs and farmers. The government can play a role in encouraging investment to flow in directions suggested by indicative planning but it cannot expect to direct this flow through direct controls.
The instruments through which some direction is possible include fiscal incentives, special treatment in the matter of credit from the banking system, access to external commercial borrowing which is still controlled, and occasionally special support in providing common infrastructure. Equally important is the need to remove impediments to private investment. While the most obvious impediments in the shape of investment licensing requirements were removed long ago, there are many other impediments which need to be tackled, many of which are at the level of states.
Policies relating to land availability for industry present major problems at present. It is widely believed that land acquisition policies in the past have been unfair to those whose land is acquired in terms of the compensation paid and also the rehabilitation required. Lack of clarity and demonstrable transparency in this area can seriously impede the achievement of 10 per cent GDP growth since that almost requires expanded availability of land for industrialization – manufacturing is expected to grow at around 14 per cent. It also implies a substantial increase in urbanization which also involves rational land use policy. This is an area where initiatives are needed both from the Centre and the states since land use is a state subject.
While much of the approach to the private sector is guided by the presumption that the best results are obtained by leaving the private sector to function in a competitive environment, this is not a sufficient response since the activities of the private sector are not necessarily limited to areas where competitive markets prevail or can even be created in principle. For example, there is a potentially large role for private investment in infrastructure development. However, these sectors also have the nature of a limited monopoly and wherever this happens, it is necessary to evolve a policy framework which balances the private sector’s need for entrepreneurial freedom and the potential to earn reasonable profits with the consumer’s need to be protected from monopolistic pricing and slippages in quality.
The Eleventh Plan emphasizes the need for PPP as a strategy for achieving the large investments that are needed in infrastructure with the limited resources available in the public sector by leveraging these limited resources with private investment wherever possible. A large number of PPP initiatives have been launched in pursuance of this policy in both the Centre and the states. Some of these involve a revenue share accruing to the public sector (e.g. in airports, ports and some highly profitable toll roads). Others involve the government having to bear a part of the cost either by giving a capital subsidy (as in many national highway projects) or by allowing the private sector entrepreneur to earn profits from associated land development, as in some highway projects and metro developments. In all these areas, governments have to play an active role to make things happen and to make them acceptable.
There is often suspicion that the terms of a PPP concession may be too favourable to the operator with not enough protection for the consumer. These suspicions can be overcome through appropriately transparent concession agreements which clearly establish the obligations to be borne by the concessionaire and there is need for a credible regulatory mechanism which can protect the interests of consumers. Further the award of PPP concessions need to be based on robust competitive bidding and not on negotiated contracts to ensure that the public interest is fully protected. As the Eleventh Plan emphasizes, the PPP strategy can only succeed if it is seen as attracting private resources for public purposes and not diverting public resources for private purposes. How to devise policies which produce such an outcome is a challenging task.
It is evident from the above that planning for the private sector is more in the nature of ‘policy planning’ and not planning by direction. This process cannot be made the exclusive responsibility of a single planning agency. Policies pertaining to individual sectors where the private sector plays an important role have to be developed through interaction with many stakeholders. Producer representatives, consumer groups, the ministry concerned, the Finance Ministry, the Planning Commission and the Law Ministry all play a role. Inter-ministerial interaction, rather than hierarchical, top down planning is what is needed to convert indicative plans into policy initiatives.
One reason why the need for planning is questioned in today’s environment is the belief that planning must be limited to government decisions and liberalization should involve a drastic reduction in the role of government. This is, however, a simplistic notion since the size of the government measured by the share of government expenditure in GDP, is much larger in the OECD countries than it is in India, once social security expenditure is included, as it must be. Reformers in India as elsewhere have repeatedly emphasized that economic reforms do not imply that the role of the government must be reduced, but only that it must be restructured. The responsibility for planning and monitoring the performance of government in its restructured form remains large.
In a market economy with a mature private sector the government does not have to engage directly in establishing new productive units wherever the private sector can set up capacity and function subject to the discipline of competition. However, there are a number of areas where expansion in capacity is desperately needed and is unlikely to materialize if we rely only on the private sector and market forces. These include investment in education and health, in rural infrastructure, in housing for the poor and in slum development, all areas crucial for achieving distributional outcomes and inclusion. The Eleventh Plan signals a major restructuring of plan expenditure towards these sectors.
This restructuring is most evident in the case of education where the share of total plan expenditure (Centre and states taken together) devoted to education has increased from 7.8 per cent in the Tenth Plan to 19.4 per cent in the Eleventh Plan. The share of expenditure devoted to health is also projected to increase significantly. The increases in expenditure shares for these sectors are accommodated by a decline in plan expenditure devoted to industry and also to certain infrastructure areas where a large part of the increase in investment needed will come from the private sector.
The shift in focus of government activity to the delivery of essential services to the aam aadmi also means that the effectiveness of delivery depends on the state governments. If we want to improve the functioning of schools for school-going children and of anganwadi centres for pre-school children, of primary health centres and sub-centres and district hospitals, if we want to provide drinking water to our villages and improve sanitation, and if we want to spend on land development and water management projects that will increase income generation capacity in rural areas, the central government can provide resources for these programmes, but the outcome depends on the functioning of local administration, which is entirely within the domain of state governments. It is a common complaint that plans provide resources, but implementation at the ground level is very poor. There are two possible reasons for this. One is that the intervention itself is not designed to achieve its results and the other is that the service providers at the ground level are not accountable to the local community. Both are planning problems.
The issue of programme design is extremely important as we shift into areas such as education and health where there are considerable differences of view on how a particular objective can be best achieved and the end result is not immediately measurable. The success of a steel plant in producing steel is more easily observed once the plant has been set up and even its cost effectiveness relative to other technologies can be relatively easily measured. The same is not true of a school since schools can be built and even function in the sense of having students and teachers but they may not produce good quality education. Independent surveys conducted by organizations such as Pratham have thrown up startling results showing that a very large percentage of children in class V cannot read material meant to be read by children in class II and much the same holds true for simple arithmetic.
The problem is easy to identify but it is not easy to determine how to remedy the situation. Is our education poor because teachers appointed to these schools do not attend school or are they too poorly trained? Is it because the motivation level of the children is not high enough or do poor levels of nutrition reduce learning ability? Or is it because the family circumstances of children from poorer families militate against learning achievement? In practice it is possible that all these factors are at work, and have to be tackled simultaneously.
Similar issues arise with regard to programme design in the area of health and nutrition. In short, achieving results in these areas is not simply a matter of spending money or even ‘monitoring’ the implementation of schemes. Monitoring badly designed interventions does not produce results. We need to remain open to programme redesign keeping in mind the results observed with existing programmes at the field level.
Subjecting government programmes to scientifically based evaluation should be a mandatory part of policy planning and a pre-requisite for continued funding. We need to measure government’s contribution to development in particular areas not by the scale of expenditure in programmes in those areas as is often the case, but by the effectiveness with which it achieves results. Such evaluation should in turn feed back constantly in adjusting the design of programmes to impose effectiveness. This task is especially difficult in the social sectors, where interventions have to be designed taking account of numerous social and sociological considerations if we are to deliver end results.
The shift in plan priorities to the social sector also poses important implementation problems because the actual delivery of services takes place at the local level. The relevant machinery is that of the state governments but they too have constraints. It is difficult to find doctors to fill positions in rural areas so we have hospitals without specialists. It is difficult to enforce accountability so teacher absenteeism in primary schools is very high. The solution usually recommended is to devolve control over the finances and functionaries for these services to local elected bodies – the panchayati raj institutions and urban local bodies – and this is currently being attempted, but the success achieved varies from state to state.
Contrary to the image of planning involving centralized control, in fact it involves a complex web of relationships between the central government, the state governments and the panchayati raj institutions in which the scope for enforcing conditions is limited. The central government increasingly provides resources to support activity in the social sectors which are in the domain of state governments and local administrations. Most observers believe that the effectiveness of delivery would be greatly increased if both finances and control over functionaries were to be devolved downwards to panchayati raj institutions. This is generally agreed as a principle, but many state governments are reluctant to implement it in practice. Success will also require considerable efforts at capacity building at the local level, and constant experimentation with considerable variation across the country reflecting region specific circumstances.
The core of the argument sketched out above is that the transition to a market economy does not eliminate the need for planning but makes the challenge of planning very different from what was once envisaged. It is relevant to ask what role does the Planning Commission have in the new dispensation. One thing is clear – the Planning Commission cannot be an overarching control body setting targets for different sectors and enforcing them through some combination of public investment and control over private investment. However, there are several distinct tasks which need to be performed and in our system, can be performed by the Planning Commission.
One task is to prepare indicative plans which explore the feasibility of and implications of alternative scenarios of faster growth over a longer term horizon. An important change from the past is that the commission no longer relies more or less exclusively on an in-house plan model. Instead, it draws on the work of many different institutions which have evolved different types of models with interesting differences in methodology and sectoral disaggregation. This quantitative projection role remains highly relevant and needs to be strengthened with greater reliance on independent research institutions.
A second task is preparing plan budgets. This involves negotiation with the ministries on perceived needs and with the Finance Ministry on available resources. The outcome of this negotiation is an agreed level of plan expenditure which is then distributed across competing ministries and also in part to state governments. The Planning Commission also interacts with state governments to persuade them of the need for undertaking sufficient levels of expenditure in critical areas such as agriculture, health, education and infrastructure. The commission’s ability to affect state government decisions is limited, but it can in principle play the role of interlocutor, advisor, honest broker, persuader and to some extent, also incentiviser. Incentives to the state government take the form of central government schemes in different ministries which require some contribution from the state government thus encouraging state governments to shift their own resources.
Finally the commission must perform the task of providing a critical evaluation of policies and their effectiveness. Ministries should obviously do this continuously and they do, but a ministry reviewing its own policies cannot always produce an objective evaluation. A second and more independent opinion is surely necessary. This is especially so since policy in one area often impinges on policies in other areas and ministries are often not in a position to assess, let alone argue the case for, the need for changes in policies in other areas.
Energy policy for example is a classic example where a coordinated approach is necessary. Since energy as a subject is dealt with by several different ministries (power, petroleum, coal, atomic energy, non-conventional energy and also involves ministries such as water resources, mining, etc.) the need for a cross-ministerial view is overwhelming.
For all these reasons, planning ‘now’ has to be very different from planning ‘then’. It is in recognition of this difference that China recently renamed the Planning Commission the National Development and Reform Commission. We have not renamed the Planning Commission but then a rose by any other name will smell as sweet! In practice, our system is also moving to achieve the much more difficult task of planning for the new economic environment. It is a process that has to rely more on persuasion than directions and has to be much more consultative than in the past.
A question frequently asked today is whether planning has any relevance in a world of economic liberalization and the market economy. The short answer is that it does, but not the kind of planning we practised in the past which derived its rationale from the belief that centralized control on resource allocation, with extensive intervention in private sector decision-making, was necessary to achieve rapid growth.
Amartya Sen’s article, which is reprinted in this volume but which first appeared in the Seminar issue on Freedom and Planning almost fifty years ago, provides a flavour of the earlier approach. Sen argued then that planning was necessary not only to achieve distributional objectives – which he points out is a traditional and much discussed basis for state intervention – but also to achieve a high rate of growth. He recognized that the industrialized world had achieved industrialization without planning and acknowledged that we could also follow this path, but warned that if we did, it would take us more than a hundred years to industrialize whereas the experience of the socialist economies showed that a much faster transition was possible with socialist planning.
The superiority of socialism in achieving rapid growth was attributed to two reasons. First, since capitalists seek profit maximization, growth in a capitalist economy is only a by-product of this process, and therefore need not occur at the fastest possible rate. Second, even if capitalists want to maximize growth, they would be less efficient at doing so because individual entrepreneurs do not have all the information necessary to achieve the best results whereas a ‘national coordinating planning organization’ would have much more information and therefore achieve better ground outcomes.
Sen also warned that planning as practised in India, without a really socialist economy, with a private sector responsible for producing consumer goods and a public sector concentrating on producer goods, was unlikely to achieve results. The model suffered from internal contradictions – the ‘middle path’, as he put it, had run out and it was necessary to take a stand on whether we really wanted a socialist economy. The case for planning was essentially a case for more comprehensive socialism, and was in his view a strong case, but we would need to move to a socialist economy.
Things have changed enormously in fifty years and not surprisingly attitudes to planning have also changed. The greatest change in perceptions that has occurred since Sen’s Seminar article of fifty years ago is the discrediting of the technical argument that a centralized planning system, led by a ‘a coordinating national planning organization’ would be more able to achieve faster growth. The costs of a centralized system of decision-making, relative to a decentralized approach of ‘letting a hundred flowers bloom’ are now much better appreciated. Centralization is of course particularly dangerous where governance is poor but even when governance is not a serious problem, centralization is likely to be inefficient because bureaucratic decision-making, subject to multiple levels of accountability, is inherently sluggish, rule bound and unlikely to promote risk-taking. It suffers from greater inertia being less likely to acknowledge mistakes and change course when evidence begins to suggest that it should.
Paradoxically, democratic governments are actually much more burdened than authoritarian regimes in this respect, because accountability in a competitive political environment often leads to dilatory procedures designed to ensure transparency and is vulnerable to constant challenges on grounds of bias and ill-intention. This in turn suggests that our democratic system is likely to yield a better economic performance, if it relies on an economy with greater reliance on market forces, rather than one subject to constant political interference.
Another important change in the plan is that the experience of the socialist countries does not point in the same direction as it did sixty years ago. Communism collapsed first in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and then in the erstwhile Soviet Union in 1990. Even more directly relevant for our circumstances is the transformation in economic policy brought about by the Communist Party of China, especially after 1984 (later imitated by Vietnam) which suggests that the way to rapid growth in a developing country is more likely to lie in liberalizing economic policy, embracing market forces and encouraging the private sector rather than moving from the mixed economy to something closer to socialism and socialist planning.
Sen proved prescient, however, in the doubts he expressed in 1959 about the effectiveness of planning as practised in India and his misgivings were largely borne out over the next twenty years. Indian planning did not succeed in achieving even moderate targets of five per cent growth set in the early five year plans. Doubts also began to be aired about whether such growth as was taking place was reaching the poor. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru himself, while introducing the Third Plan in Parliament in August 1962, said that per capita income had increased but ‘a legitimate query is made. Where has this gone?’ He went on to observe that he could see that people were better fed and clothed but ‘that does not apply to everyone. Some people have hardly benefited. Some people may even be experiencing various difficulties.’
The need to focus on delivering benefits to the common man led the Indian Planning Commission to prepare a Perspective Plan aimed at bringing everyone up to a minimum level of living within 15 years from 1961 to 1976. The Planning Commission strategy document concluded that because the benefits of growth do not flow equally to all sections, this objective could be achieved for the third decile from the bottom, if the economy grew at an average rate of seven per cent per year over the period. However, even with growth at this rate, which was judged to be feasible, the poorest two deciles would not benefit sufficiently to reach the minimum. Special income transfer mechanisms would be needed to bring this group to the minimum level, but this could be managed without disrupting the growth process.
As it happened, economic performance fell well short of the seven per cent target. The average growth rate in the period 1960 to 1980 was only 3.5 per cent per year, famously described by the late Professor Raj Krishna as ‘the Hindu rate of growth’. Interestingly, the failure on the growth front did not lead, as it should have, to questioning the growth strategy itself. That came much later, though the basic weakness was precisely the one identified in Sen’s article – an effort to control private sector activity excessively leads to conflicting incentives. Initially, the response of the planners was to accept the low growth performance as unavoidable and to shift the emphasis on anti-poverty schemes. This approach had little effect on poverty.
India’s growth performance improved significantly in the 1980s when the economy grew at an average of 5-6 per cent per year. Interestingly, this was not because we became more socialist, but because we learnt from the experience of other countries in East Asia and started to liberalize and give greater play to the market. These trends were initiated in the mid 1980s, when the government became much less suspicious and more supportive of the private sector. The existing framework of controls was not dismantled, but it was administered more liberally.
A much more explicit change in policy occurred after 1991, with an explicit acceptance of the need to bring about a systemic change, albeit in a gradualist fashion. The private sector was freed of much of the stifling controls that had been evolved over many years in the name of planning and rational allocation of scarce resources. Much greater room was allowed for entrepreneurs to respond freely to market forces with greater reliance on competition to increase efficiency. The economy was also opened gradually to foreign trade and foreign capital.
Was this a dismantling of planning? Not if one takes the view that the purpose of planning is to put in place policies that seek to exploit the growth potential of the economy and to push it to achieve stated developmental goals. The change in policy was a considered response and the trend has continued despite changes in government. The new approach to policy is evident not only in the Centre but also in the states. The results in terms of economic growth have been impressive, comprehensively refuting the critics who argued that the changes would lead to a collapse in performance and perpetual foreign exchange crises. The average growth rate achieved in the Tenth Plan 2002-03 to 2006-07 was 7.6 per cent per year, marginally short of the target of eight per cent and a very far cry from the so called Hindu rate of growth. The past four years 2004-05 to 2007-08 have seen an average growth rate of close to nine per cent.
Growth is expected to slow down in 2008-09 to around eight per cent or possibly even a little lower and there has been much focus on this deceleration in the press. However, cyclical variations in growth are normal and would still represent an impressive performance in a year when the world economy is slowing down significantly. Most observers agree that India is well set on the path of rapid growth and the Eleventh Plan target of averaging nine per cent growth per year and setting the economy at a 10 per cent growth path by the end of the plan period is eminently achievable, provided supportive policies outlined in the Eleventh Plan are put in place.
The record is less impressive when we focus on distributional outcomes and this is rightly a major concern of policy today. The percentage of the population below the poverty line is falling, but far too slowly. Child malnutrition is very high at 40 per cent in 2005-06, with micro-nutrient deficiencies being even higher. Health facilities available to the population are well below what is needed and access to quality education is still limited, especially in rural areas. The recently approved Eleventh Plan recognizes these deficiencies and explicitly sets its objectives in terms of ‘inclusive growth’. The plan aims at an average growth rate of nine per cent rising to 10 per cent at the end of the plan period. In addition, to the traditional growth target it also sets 26 other targets for indicators of social development.
This brings us to the question, what sort of planning do we need to achieve these objectives? First we must recognise that the instruments of planning must be very different in a market economy that is increasingly integrated with the world. We do not need to set objectives in terms of detailed output targets emerging from multi-sector input output based models of the economy and then try to direct private investment to meet these sub-sectoral growth projections. Sectoral balances aimed at matching demand and supply in 200 sub-sectors used to be the staple of planning exercises in India, but they are meaningless for sectors where the output is importable and foreign trade is liberalized because any excess demand for a particular product can be made good by imports. The planning problem is in effect reduced to the problem of managing the resulting balance of payments.
This is one problem we have actually handled very well. The liberalization of the past fifteen years has clearly established that it is not necessary to control imports as we used to in order to manage the balance of payments. In fact, the complex system of import controls that was ostensibly designed to conserve scarce foreign exchange, actually served only to provide open-ended protection for domestic producers against foreign competition. It led to a high cost and low quality domestic production structure, which in turn reduced India’s capacity to produce exportable quality products at competitive prices. It also promoted extensive corruption associated with running a complex and highly discretionary import control system.
The inappropriateness of import controls in a world of fast changing technology is best illustrated by the experience of Infosys related to me by its founder Chairman, N.R. Narayanamurthy. According to him, Infosys, in the late 1980s applied for a license to import a particular Hewlett Packard computer and received a license specifying the model number. The process took six months and by the time the license was received by the company, HP had come out with a later version having a larger capacity and a lower price. However, Infosys could not import this product against the license because the product had a different model number. Infosys was told it would have to get a fresh license, which would of course take another six months and no one could say what would happen if computer models changed again! We certainly could not possibly have achieved what we have in software if government policies had not changed.
It is worth noting that ever since we adopted import liberalization and a market driven exchange rate in 1993 – a shift that was accompanied by a cacophony of warnings that liberalization would bring a balance of payments crisis – we have actually never had a foreign exchange crisis! The problem, if anything has been the reverse. We have had a surplus of foreign exchange and are debating how best to use it.
Was this liberalization a dismantling of planning? Not really, unless we mistake particular instruments of control for planning. It was in fact a recognition that good planning involves putting in place policies that will allow the economy to perform to its full potential and a private sector dominated economy needs to give much greater freedom to private enterprise within the framework of a competitive economy. This is not to say that reliance on markets will take care of all objectives. It will not take care of distributional objectives since not everyone will benefit sufficiently from exclusive reliance on markets. It also does not take care of market failures, which warrant corrective action. These problems need to be addressed through carefully crafted policies and programmes involving suitably designed government intervention at multiple levels. There is also a role for planning to sketch out a broad perspective of the economy evolving over a longer term which can be called indicative planning.
By indicative planning, I mean defining broad national goals and objectives, and presenting an internally consistent picture of the evolution of the economy in a manner which achieves these national over a defined time horizon. In India, for example, if we could set the goal of achieving some target level of per capita income over a specified period – say increasing our per capita income from $1000 today to $5000 over 20 years combined with corresponding improvements in the access of the population to a basic minimum level of living over this period. Indicative planning can then be used to outline broad challenges in achieving this goal.
If population growth over this period averages say 1.3 per cent per year, then GDP will have to grow at an average rate of about 10 per cent per year for per capita income to reach $5000 in 20 years. It is a legitimate planning exercise to explore the medium to longer term implications of such growth to identify some of the major challenges it poses.
We do not need to develop detailed multi-sector models looking for precise estimates of the domestic production requirement of individual commodities and the inputs needed for them. However, we do need to examine broad areas of feasibility in terms of the levels of domestic savings and investment needed for this growth, the financial structure and investment climate which that requires in an economy driven by the private sector and open to the world, the implications of such growth for India’s interaction with the rest of the world, and finally the effort we need to make to develop the technological capacity to help achieve our national objectives. If India is to become the country with the third largest GDP in the world after China and the USA (in that order), it is relevant to ask what is the nature and quality of our educational and scientific institutions and the interaction between our private corporations and research and development consistent with this goal.
Indicative planning can help to highlight the longer term structural changes that are likely to arise as a consequence of such growth and the challenges they pose in terms of action to be taken sufficiently in advance. For example, what would a 10 per cent growth, and the growth of manufacturing of around 14 per cent per year, mean in terms of the pace of urbanization and are our systems for urban planning capable of responding to this challenge? If our urban population over this period increases by about 150 million, are our urban systems of government, and their financial arrangements, capable of supporting such an expansion especially considering the enormous improvement needed in the quality of urban infrastructure? What are the energy requirements of such growth and can they be met from available energy sources with a modicum of assurance of energy security? If the price of conventional energy is expected to rise sharply will this affect our growth potential and can we take steps to minimize this effect? As pointed out earlier, we do not need to worry about ensuring adequate sectoral supplies of most items that are importable, but we do need to worry about tradable goods such as petroleum and coal which though importable are likely to become globally scarce, and therefore very high priced.
Planning is also needed to ensure adequate growth in domestic capacity in the non-tradable sector, where imports are not an option. This includes development of most basic infrastructure such as roads, ports, airports, telecommunications, electricity and also basic urban infrastructure, including water supply and sewerage. In all these areas, investments involve considerable resources and long time-lags and often require government initiative and support. It is necessary to define the tasks before the government (both Centre and the states) well in advance and to take steps now for the future.
Indicative planning can draw attention to critical areas and identify difficult policy choices for overall goals to be achieved, but it does not necessarily have to specify precise targets and instruments for achieving these goals. Often its role is to draw attention to the problems, indicate a broad direction for the solution and stimulate debate and discussion overcoming these problems, a debate in which numerous stakeholders get involved before workable policies are implemented.
To be relevant, planning today also has to recognize that the private sector, which includes farmers, small enterprises and organized industry, accounts for 75 per cent of total investment and the dynamism of this sector is therefore a critical determinant of overall economic performance. Planning in this environment has to be based on the assumption that decisions in individual firms and farms have to be left to individual entrepreneurs and farmers. The government can play a role in encouraging investment to flow in directions suggested by indicative planning but it cannot expect to direct this flow through direct controls.
The instruments through which some direction is possible include fiscal incentives, special treatment in the matter of credit from the banking system, access to external commercial borrowing which is still controlled, and occasionally special support in providing common infrastructure. Equally important is the need to remove impediments to private investment. While the most obvious impediments in the shape of investment licensing requirements were removed long ago, there are many other impediments which need to be tackled, many of which are at the level of states.
Policies relating to land availability for industry present major problems at present. It is widely believed that land acquisition policies in the past have been unfair to those whose land is acquired in terms of the compensation paid and also the rehabilitation required. Lack of clarity and demonstrable transparency in this area can seriously impede the achievement of 10 per cent GDP growth since that almost requires expanded availability of land for industrialization – manufacturing is expected to grow at around 14 per cent. It also implies a substantial increase in urbanization which also involves rational land use policy. This is an area where initiatives are needed both from the Centre and the states since land use is a state subject.
While much of the approach to the private sector is guided by the presumption that the best results are obtained by leaving the private sector to function in a competitive environment, this is not a sufficient response since the activities of the private sector are not necessarily limited to areas where competitive markets prevail or can even be created in principle. For example, there is a potentially large role for private investment in infrastructure development. However, these sectors also have the nature of a limited monopoly and wherever this happens, it is necessary to evolve a policy framework which balances the private sector’s need for entrepreneurial freedom and the potential to earn reasonable profits with the consumer’s need to be protected from monopolistic pricing and slippages in quality.
The Eleventh Plan emphasizes the need for PPP as a strategy for achieving the large investments that are needed in infrastructure with the limited resources available in the public sector by leveraging these limited resources with private investment wherever possible. A large number of PPP initiatives have been launched in pursuance of this policy in both the Centre and the states. Some of these involve a revenue share accruing to the public sector (e.g. in airports, ports and some highly profitable toll roads). Others involve the government having to bear a part of the cost either by giving a capital subsidy (as in many national highway projects) or by allowing the private sector entrepreneur to earn profits from associated land development, as in some highway projects and metro developments. In all these areas, governments have to play an active role to make things happen and to make them acceptable.
There is often suspicion that the terms of a PPP concession may be too favourable to the operator with not enough protection for the consumer. These suspicions can be overcome through appropriately transparent concession agreements which clearly establish the obligations to be borne by the concessionaire and there is need for a credible regulatory mechanism which can protect the interests of consumers. Further the award of PPP concessions need to be based on robust competitive bidding and not on negotiated contracts to ensure that the public interest is fully protected. As the Eleventh Plan emphasizes, the PPP strategy can only succeed if it is seen as attracting private resources for public purposes and not diverting public resources for private purposes. How to devise policies which produce such an outcome is a challenging task.
It is evident from the above that planning for the private sector is more in the nature of ‘policy planning’ and not planning by direction. This process cannot be made the exclusive responsibility of a single planning agency. Policies pertaining to individual sectors where the private sector plays an important role have to be developed through interaction with many stakeholders. Producer representatives, consumer groups, the ministry concerned, the Finance Ministry, the Planning Commission and the Law Ministry all play a role. Inter-ministerial interaction, rather than hierarchical, top down planning is what is needed to convert indicative plans into policy initiatives.
One reason why the need for planning is questioned in today’s environment is the belief that planning must be limited to government decisions and liberalization should involve a drastic reduction in the role of government. This is, however, a simplistic notion since the size of the government measured by the share of government expenditure in GDP, is much larger in the OECD countries than it is in India, once social security expenditure is included, as it must be. Reformers in India as elsewhere have repeatedly emphasized that economic reforms do not imply that the role of the government must be reduced, but only that it must be restructured. The responsibility for planning and monitoring the performance of government in its restructured form remains large.
In a market economy with a mature private sector the government does not have to engage directly in establishing new productive units wherever the private sector can set up capacity and function subject to the discipline of competition. However, there are a number of areas where expansion in capacity is desperately needed and is unlikely to materialize if we rely only on the private sector and market forces. These include investment in education and health, in rural infrastructure, in housing for the poor and in slum development, all areas crucial for achieving distributional outcomes and inclusion. The Eleventh Plan signals a major restructuring of plan expenditure towards these sectors.
This restructuring is most evident in the case of education where the share of total plan expenditure (Centre and states taken together) devoted to education has increased from 7.8 per cent in the Tenth Plan to 19.4 per cent in the Eleventh Plan. The share of expenditure devoted to health is also projected to increase significantly. The increases in expenditure shares for these sectors are accommodated by a decline in plan expenditure devoted to industry and also to certain infrastructure areas where a large part of the increase in investment needed will come from the private sector.
The shift in focus of government activity to the delivery of essential services to the aam aadmi also means that the effectiveness of delivery depends on the state governments. If we want to improve the functioning of schools for school-going children and of anganwadi centres for pre-school children, of primary health centres and sub-centres and district hospitals, if we want to provide drinking water to our villages and improve sanitation, and if we want to spend on land development and water management projects that will increase income generation capacity in rural areas, the central government can provide resources for these programmes, but the outcome depends on the functioning of local administration, which is entirely within the domain of state governments. It is a common complaint that plans provide resources, but implementation at the ground level is very poor. There are two possible reasons for this. One is that the intervention itself is not designed to achieve its results and the other is that the service providers at the ground level are not accountable to the local community. Both are planning problems.
The issue of programme design is extremely important as we shift into areas such as education and health where there are considerable differences of view on how a particular objective can be best achieved and the end result is not immediately measurable. The success of a steel plant in producing steel is more easily observed once the plant has been set up and even its cost effectiveness relative to other technologies can be relatively easily measured. The same is not true of a school since schools can be built and even function in the sense of having students and teachers but they may not produce good quality education. Independent surveys conducted by organizations such as Pratham have thrown up startling results showing that a very large percentage of children in class V cannot read material meant to be read by children in class II and much the same holds true for simple arithmetic.
The problem is easy to identify but it is not easy to determine how to remedy the situation. Is our education poor because teachers appointed to these schools do not attend school or are they too poorly trained? Is it because the motivation level of the children is not high enough or do poor levels of nutrition reduce learning ability? Or is it because the family circumstances of children from poorer families militate against learning achievement? In practice it is possible that all these factors are at work, and have to be tackled simultaneously.
Similar issues arise with regard to programme design in the area of health and nutrition. In short, achieving results in these areas is not simply a matter of spending money or even ‘monitoring’ the implementation of schemes. Monitoring badly designed interventions does not produce results. We need to remain open to programme redesign keeping in mind the results observed with existing programmes at the field level.
Subjecting government programmes to scientifically based evaluation should be a mandatory part of policy planning and a pre-requisite for continued funding. We need to measure government’s contribution to development in particular areas not by the scale of expenditure in programmes in those areas as is often the case, but by the effectiveness with which it achieves results. Such evaluation should in turn feed back constantly in adjusting the design of programmes to impose effectiveness. This task is especially difficult in the social sectors, where interventions have to be designed taking account of numerous social and sociological considerations if we are to deliver end results.
The shift in plan priorities to the social sector also poses important implementation problems because the actual delivery of services takes place at the local level. The relevant machinery is that of the state governments but they too have constraints. It is difficult to find doctors to fill positions in rural areas so we have hospitals without specialists. It is difficult to enforce accountability so teacher absenteeism in primary schools is very high. The solution usually recommended is to devolve control over the finances and functionaries for these services to local elected bodies – the panchayati raj institutions and urban local bodies – and this is currently being attempted, but the success achieved varies from state to state.
Contrary to the image of planning involving centralized control, in fact it involves a complex web of relationships between the central government, the state governments and the panchayati raj institutions in which the scope for enforcing conditions is limited. The central government increasingly provides resources to support activity in the social sectors which are in the domain of state governments and local administrations. Most observers believe that the effectiveness of delivery would be greatly increased if both finances and control over functionaries were to be devolved downwards to panchayati raj institutions. This is generally agreed as a principle, but many state governments are reluctant to implement it in practice. Success will also require considerable efforts at capacity building at the local level, and constant experimentation with considerable variation across the country reflecting region specific circumstances.
The core of the argument sketched out above is that the transition to a market economy does not eliminate the need for planning but makes the challenge of planning very different from what was once envisaged. It is relevant to ask what role does the Planning Commission have in the new dispensation. One thing is clear – the Planning Commission cannot be an overarching control body setting targets for different sectors and enforcing them through some combination of public investment and control over private investment. However, there are several distinct tasks which need to be performed and in our system, can be performed by the Planning Commission.
One task is to prepare indicative plans which explore the feasibility of and implications of alternative scenarios of faster growth over a longer term horizon. An important change from the past is that the commission no longer relies more or less exclusively on an in-house plan model. Instead, it draws on the work of many different institutions which have evolved different types of models with interesting differences in methodology and sectoral disaggregation. This quantitative projection role remains highly relevant and needs to be strengthened with greater reliance on independent research institutions.
A second task is preparing plan budgets. This involves negotiation with the ministries on perceived needs and with the Finance Ministry on available resources. The outcome of this negotiation is an agreed level of plan expenditure which is then distributed across competing ministries and also in part to state governments. The Planning Commission also interacts with state governments to persuade them of the need for undertaking sufficient levels of expenditure in critical areas such as agriculture, health, education and infrastructure. The commission’s ability to affect state government decisions is limited, but it can in principle play the role of interlocutor, advisor, honest broker, persuader and to some extent, also incentiviser. Incentives to the state government take the form of central government schemes in different ministries which require some contribution from the state government thus encouraging state governments to shift their own resources.
Finally the commission must perform the task of providing a critical evaluation of policies and their effectiveness. Ministries should obviously do this continuously and they do, but a ministry reviewing its own policies cannot always produce an objective evaluation. A second and more independent opinion is surely necessary. This is especially so since policy in one area often impinges on policies in other areas and ministries are often not in a position to assess, let alone argue the case for, the need for changes in policies in other areas.
Energy policy for example is a classic example where a coordinated approach is necessary. Since energy as a subject is dealt with by several different ministries (power, petroleum, coal, atomic energy, non-conventional energy and also involves ministries such as water resources, mining, etc.) the need for a cross-ministerial view is overwhelming.
For all these reasons, planning ‘now’ has to be very different from planning ‘then’. It is in recognition of this difference that China recently renamed the Planning Commission the National Development and Reform Commission. We have not renamed the Planning Commission but then a rose by any other name will smell as sweet! In practice, our system is also moving to achieve the much more difficult task of planning for the new economic environment. It is a process that has to rely more on persuasion than directions and has to be much more consultative than in the past.
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